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JCS 1731/4816 September 1961Page 4047.

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

TRANSMITTAL OF WSEG STAFF STUDIES NO. 83 AND NO. 86 (U)

Reference: JCS 1731/412 - 2050 (27 Sept 60)

The attached memorandum by the Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Log No. C-61-545, dated 5 September 1961, subject as above, is circulated for information.

F. J. BLOVIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP  
Washington 25, D.C.

Log No. C-61-545  
5 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Transmittal of WSEG Staff Studies No. 83 and No. 86.

1. Transmitted herewith are twenty (20) copies each of WSEG Staff Studies No. 83,\* "US Strategic Objectives and Military Deployments in NATO as Related to the Problem of Arms Control," and No. 86,\* "US Overseas Bases in a Changing International Climate." Staff Study No. 86, which was completed first, is intended as an introduction to Staff Study No. 83 and to later studies on specific world areas, from the US viewpoint.

2. These studies were undertaken as a part of WSEG Report No. 52 on Arms Control, directed by SM-990-60.\*\* They are being forwarded at this time because the next phase of WSEG Report No. 52 will not be completed until later. Since US negotiating positions on arms control are a matter of continuing study, it is felt that the analysis contained in Staff Studies No. 83 and No. 86 might be of some current utility.

3. Copies of Staff Studies No. 83 and No. 86 are being distributed only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For your information, a brief synopsis of the findings of WSEG Staff Studies No. 82, No. 83, No. 85, and No. 86 is being furnished the Secretary of Defense, with an information copy to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

/s/

Wm. P. ENNIS, JR.  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director

Enclosures - S-61-435, copies 31-50  
S-61-466, copies 31-50

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\*\* Enclosure A to JCS 1731/412

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

WSEG STAFF STUDY NO. 83

U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY  
DEPLOYMENTS IN NATO, AS RELATED TO THE  
PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL

30 August 1961

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For No. S-61-435

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WSEG STAFF STUDY NO. 83

U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY  
DEPLOYMENTS IN NATO, AS RELATED TO THE  
PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL

PROBLEM

1. To analyze the U.S. strategic objectives and military  
deployments in NATO, with special emphasis on West Germany,  
in order to assess the implications for the possibilities of  
arms control.


SCOPE

2. This Staff Study is concerned primarily with the U.S.  
military deployment in West Germany (including West Berlin),  
as the dominant element of the U.S. force commitment to NATO.  
Consideration is also given to the wider context of the entire  
NATO confrontation, where appropriate, and to U.S. political  
and military objectives in the remainder of the world. Partic-  
ular emphasis is placed on the peculiarly political aspects  
of the German problem because of their influence upon the  
strategic objectives and military deployments of the two  
opposing power blocs. In the light of these political con-  
siderations, possible alterations in the U.S. deployment in  
West Germany are examined in order to assess the prospects for  
arms control measures which may possibly relax world tensions  
and yet not compromise U.S. strategic objectives in Europe.

3. The nature of the problems considered is, of course,  
such that their dimensions may change materially in a very  
short space of time. Events may completely overtake certain  
statements of fact. The validity of pertinent conclusions  
will therefore be subject to appropriate qualification.

WSEG Staff Study No. 83


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WSEG STAFF STUDY NO. 83

U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY  
DEPLOYMENTS IN NATO, AS RELATED TO THE  
PROBLEM OF ARMS CONTROL

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SUMMARY<sup>1/</sup>


INTRODUCTORY

4. Any consideration of arms control must recognize the interaction of the military and political objectives of the opposing forces. Today these problems, while worldwide in their implications, find their focus in the NATO area and particularly in the East-West confrontation in the divided territory of Germany. The effect of these conflicting pressures upon NATO has increasingly been to weaken the unity of the Western Alliance. (Paragraphs 29, 21, 92.)

THE PROBLEM FACING NATO

5. Much of NATO's current disunity is directly traceable to a lack of consensus within the Alliance concerning the existing strategy for coping with the Communist threat. The present NATO strategy of primary reliance upon nuclear weapons for deterring Soviet aggression was agreed to at a time when the possibility that this strategy would have to be implemented appeared relatively remote, because of U.S. superiority in long-range nuclear delivery systems. Since the 1954 NATO Council decision in which NATO's current strategy was adopted, however, the Soviets have gradually narrowed the gap in strategic delivery systems, and have become increasingly insistent that the U.S. and its NATO Allies take cognizance of this fact by making appropriate adjustments in the worldwide political-military confrontation between the two power blocs. As Soviet pressure has become more intense, NATO has become increasingly uneasy at the prospect of having to

1/ The paragraph numbers in parentheses at the conclusion of each paragraph of the Summary and Conclusions refer to the location in the Staff Study of main ideas in the development of the analysis.






activate a strategy which was fashioned in a military environ-  
ment considerably more favorable to the West than the present  
one. (Paragraphs 21, 92, 90.)

6. NATO's military strategy is not the only cause for dis-  
unity in the West. NATO is also suffering from the divisive  
effects of disputes involving the relationship of NATO to its  
members' interests outside Europe. On the one hand, some NATO  
members have insisted that the Alliance must support their  
efforts to retain power in colonial and former colonial areas.  
On the other hand, the Communists and also some neutralists  
have attempted to portray NATO as an instrument of imperialism  
by the white, industrialized Western countries against the  
underdeveloped regions of the world. When these divisive  
issues have been injected into the disagreements already being  
waged within NATO regarding the nature of the Communist threat  
itself -- disagreements as to whether this threat is primarily  
military or social and economic -- the net effect has been to  
weaken further the basis for common action within the Alliance.  
(Paragraphs 21, 22, 24, 125.)

7. A common theme underlying many of the problems currently  
confronting NATO is the growing conviction, among Alliance  
members and nonmembers alike, that NATO's strategic policies  
are not only of European, but of worldwide, significance. Thus  
the current Western-Soviet conflict arising from the German  
problem appears intimately enmeshed with such larger world  
forces as the systemic revolution now sweeping the underde-  
veloped countries, and with the widespread pressures for some  
relaxation of the international tensions which may lead to  
nuclear war. (Paragraphs 22, 23.)




U.S. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN NATO

8. Since 1950, when the decision to rearm the West Germans 1  
was taken at the insistence of the U.S., the role of West 2  
Germany has become steadily more important to U.S. strategy 3  
in Europe. A major objective of the U.S. military deployment 4  
in West Germany has been to provide a shield against attack 5  
by the Soviets while the West German political, economic and 6  
military strength was being restored. A corollary of this 7  
objective has been the U.S. policy of tying West Germany 8  
closely to an integrated and unified Western Europe, primarily 9  
to erect a strategic counterbalance to the Soviet threat in 10  
the East, but also to act as a constraint against the possi- 11  
bility of future German military adventuring. Thus West 12  
Germany, for geographical, political, economic, and military 13  
reasons has become the key European country for the further- 14  
ance of U.S. strategic objectives in NATO. (Paragraphs 46, 15  
47, 52.) 16

9. The U.S. military deployment in West Germany, linked as 17  
it is to U.S. and British strategic retaliatory forces, has as 18  
its primary element the capability for immediate and destruc- 19  
tive nuclear war as a deterrent against Soviet aggression. 20  
The U.S. deployment and strategy do not, however, imply that 21  
every military response to Soviet aggression will be a nuclear 22  
one. A significant capability for conventional war also 23  
exists, making it necessary for the Soviets to mount a major 24  
assault in order to overwhelm the NATO forces. (Paragraphs 25  
48, 49, 50, 76, 88.) 26

10. NATO's combined "sword and shield" strategy has, appar- 27  
ently, deterred the Soviets from overt military aggression in 28  
Europe for the past decade. The NATO military posture is 29



obviously not adequate, however, to deter serious Communist harassment of the exposed Western position in Berlin. (Paragraphs 59, 65, 66, 70.)


#### ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING U.S.-SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

11. The symbolic significance of Berlin can hardly be overestimated. To the West Germans Berlin is a symbol both of the hope for eventual reunification and of the value of the tie to NATO. To the Soviets it is a symbol of the unsettled state of the German frontiers, of the continued instability of the Communist regime in Eastern Europe, and of a projection of Western power into the Communist sphere of influence. Because of the potentially dangerous effect of a resurgent West Germany on this volatile situation, Communist harassment in Berlin appears to be increasingly directed, not so much at the Western presence, per se, but at the link between Berlin and West Germany. (Paragraphs 67, 69, 80a, 94.)

12. The immediate Soviet political objectives in Eastern and Central Europe appear, at least from the Soviet standpoint, to be defensive in nature. To support these political objectives the Soviets have pursued a defensive military strategy which is backed up by offensive military capabilities emphasizing armor, firepower and mobility. (Paragraphs 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86.)

13. U.S. political objectives in Europe are wholly defensive. The U.S. has therefore also pursued a defensive military strategy which is backed up by offensive military forces emphasizing immediate and massive nuclear delivery capabilities. (Paragraphs 81, 83, 84, 85, 86.)

14. The seeming paradox of the two sides simultaneously viewing their own political objectives as defensive and each




other's as offensive is probably to be explained chiefly by 1  
the radically different views held by the two opposing power 2  
blocs regarding the nature of the status quo. While both sides 3  
appear reluctant to attempt to change the status quo by military 4  
means, each appears convinced that its opponent may make such 5  
an attempt. (In the case of the Soviets, the concern in Europe 6  
is apparently directed more at the future designs of the West 7  
Germans than at those of the U.S.) (Paragraphs 81, 82, 83, 94.) 8

15. The Soviets are apparently exploiting their position in 9  
regard to Berlin in an effort to force a Western, and partic- 10  
ularly a West German, acceptance of their view of the status 11  
quo -- a view which includes both an acceptance of Soviet 12  
"Security" objectives in Eastern Europe and a recognition of 13  
the dynamic, irreversible nature of Communist postwar advances. 14  
The NATO deterrent strategy in Europe is peculiarly sensitive 15  
to such a Soviet exploitation because of the concern of the 16  
Western European powers over nuclear war and because of the 17  
opportunities it offers the Soviets for psychological, 18  
political and economic harassment. (Paragraphs 106, 92b and c.) 19

#### CONCLUSIONS

##### IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO

16. The present crisis in Berlin can be viewed as a micro- 20  
cosmic expression of the entire NATO-Soviet confrontation in 21  
Europe. Combined in the Berlin problem are aspects of all the 22  
major issues which divide the two power blocs -- the con- 23  
flicting views regarding the nature of the status quo; the 24  
opposing political objectives in Europe; the supporting 25  
military strategies of both sides; and the resultant danger of 26  
nuclear war. Analysis of these issues suggests that they are 27  
all indissolubly related to each other, and that it would be 28  
difficult to separate them for purposes of negotiation with 29




the Soviets. In fact, for the West to negotiate only on its present position in West Berlin would undoubtedly represent a major psychological and diplomatic defeat. (Paragraphs 94, 95, 110, 104, 105, 115.)

17. This is not to say that the Berlin problem is not negotiable. On the contrary, it probably must ultimately be negotiated. The alternatives to negotiation would otherwise seem to be either major detriment to the political objectives of one side or the other, or else the possibility of a nuclear war which neither side desires. Since neither side appears willing to abandon any of its major political objectives, the problem seems to be to devise a solution which (1) lessens the danger of nuclear war, and (2) at the same time preserves the basic political objectives of both sides. (Paragraphs 100, 102, 103, 104.)

18. As one facet of a global political offensive against the Communist Bloc, it might be to the advantage of the West to propose a negotiated solution of the German problem, in order to reverse the pattern of frequent pre-emption of the political initiative by the Communists. Such a Western-initiated proposal, aimed at both the settlement of political problems and at lessening the danger of nuclear war, might take something of the following form, as a package:

a. The Soviets to accept, formally, Berlin as the future capital of a reunited Germany -- with complete reunification to be delayed until such time as the international situation makes it feasible.

b. All of Berlin to be internationalized under U.N. auspices, with the current occupying powers appointed as



trustees for their present sectors, and the West Germans 1  
authorized to act as agents to maintain the economic life 2  
of the western portion of the city. 3

c. Access to Berlin through East Germany to be guaranteed 4  
to the Western Powers (including West Germany) by the Soviet 5  
Union and by East Germany. 6


d. The West Germans to accept, de facto, the present 7  
boundaries between East and West Germany, and also the Oder- 8  
Neisse Line, by a statement to the effect that no attempt 9  
would be made to change present German frontiers by force. 10

e. The West Germans to accept East Germany as auton- 11  
omous, on a limited confederal basis involving primarily 12  
economic matters, "until such time as international 13  
conditions allow the final unification of Germany." 14

f. The Soviets to withdraw a substantial portion of their 15  
military forces from East Germany and possibly also from the 16  
other satellites. 17

g. Depending on the extent of the Soviet reduction, the 18  
U.S. to agree to alter the arrangements by which it can make 19  
nuclear weapons available to its allies, so as to reduce 20  
Soviet concern that these weapons might become a basis for 21  
possible future West German military adventuring. (Para- 22  
graphs 122, 108, 130.) 23

19. Such a combined settlement, even if only partial, of 24  
the Berlin crisis, the "German problem", and the most pressing 25  
elements of the European arms control problem should lessen the 26  
danger of nuclear war over Berlin and at the same time safe- 27  
guard U.S. political and military objectives in Europe. It 28  
should also have a salutary effect upon the other divisive 29  
issues on the international scene which are currently weakening 30  
the unity of NATO. (Paragraphs 110, 121, 129, 130.) 31



## DISCUSSION

### INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM FACING NATO

20. The unity and strength of NATO are matters of overriding importance for U.S. strategic objectives in the European area. NATO is not only the foundation of Western military resistance to Soviet expansion, but it represents, in addition, both the symbol and the actuality of the Free World's chief hope for unity in nonmilitary fields against the total Communist threat. Such a basic unity of the Free World, in overall objectives and principles, is essential if the monolithic threat of Communism in the world is to be effectively met. Yet it is precisely the unity of NATO which is being increasingly called into question because of problems arising across almost the entire spectrum of NATO's concerns. Nowhere do these problems assume greater significance than in the complex of international events focusing on the Free World-Communist confrontation, and especially on the U.S.-Soviet opposing military postures, in the divided territory of Germany.

21. Possibly the first factor which should be recognized, in considering this confrontation, is that the Western Alliance itself has become less certain regarding the objectives of NATO and its relations with both its own members and the rest

1/ The NATO Handbook states: "From the time of the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, the member governments recognized that while co-operation for defence was the first and most urgent task, it was also essential that this same co-operation be extended to other fields. The success of any alliance is in fact dependent on the extent to which its members agree on all matters of common interest.... Today NATO is active in many spheres: political co-operation, common defence, economic, scientific and technical co-operation, civil emergency planning, information, cultural exchanges." NATO Handbook, Eighth Edition, July 1960, page 49.

of the world.<sup>1/</sup> In NATO's first decade there was extensive  
agreement among Alliance members that NATO fulfilled its primary  
function of protecting their security against the threat of Soviet  
aggression. But the world situation has changed radically in the  
past ten years. A major factor in this change has been the  
acquisition by the Soviet Union of a strategic counterdeterrent  
capability. Equally significant has been the Soviets' shift in  
tactics away from an emphasis on overt force as a means of ex-  
pansion in favor of more complex, less direct, and more long-  
range measures.<sup>2/</sup> Other important factors in the altered world  
situation have been the rapid emergence of the less developed  
nations as a relatively neutral bloc, the growing sensitiveness  
of the major NATO powers to their individual national interests,  
and an apparently sharpening incongruity between the implica-  
tions of the missile-nuclear revolution and former concepts  
concerning the use of military force. These developments have  
raised searching questions regarding NATO's purposes, capa-  
bilities, obligations and future courses of action.

22. A common underlying theme to most of the major problems  
confronting NATO today is the growing insistence, among NATO  
members and nonmembers alike, that NATO's strategic policies are  
not only of European, but of worldwide, significance. Thus, it  
has been argued that if the U.S., Great Britain and France are to  
have a unified policy in Western Europe, they cannot simulta-  
neously have divergent, or even very different, policies in

- 1/ The recently completed Bowie Report, for example, makes the following statement in its chapter on NATO Defense: "Today the Nato Alliance is subject to a gathering ferment of doubts and disagreement. This deepening unease is rooted in a weakening consensus on the nature of the Soviet threat, and on the best ways of meeting Communist pressure. It is also rooted in a declining confidence in the existing strategy of the Alliance." The North Atlantic Nations: Tasks for the 1960's, A Report to the Secretary of State by Robert R. Bowie, August 1960, page 27, SECRET.
- 2/ Cf. NATO Handbook, op. cit., page 16: "From 1955 onwards, the Soviet threat which had hitherto been confined to Europe and of a military character took on more varied aspects and spread to all parts of the world."




Southcast Asia. Most especially, so runs this argument, the policies of Alliance members must be unified in matters external to Europe if the results of these policies may impinge significantly on a member's ability to carry out its NATO commitments within Europe. The thrust of this reasoning is sometimes reversed, however, and the contention is advanced that NATO must be held collectively and severally responsible for the actions of its individual members in all parts of the world, whether NATO's formal purposes appear to be involved or not.<sup>1/</sup> NATO's strategic policies are also held to be a matter of worldwide concern because of the technological advances in missile nuclear weaponry which have vastly expanded both the geographical and destructive scope of warfare.

23. The Free World-Soviet confrontation in Western Europe has thus become a crucial consideration for peoples everywhere. The fundamental strategic problem of NATO can no longer be regarded solely as that of devising an effective military defense for Western Europe. For better or worse, the military, political and economic problems of NATO and its members have become intimately enmeshed with larger international problems affecting the future of nations the world over.

24. These worldwide pressures upon NATO are not surprising when one views the East-West struggle against the background of the international situation as a whole. The dominant aspect of the world scene today is the accelerating pace of an age of revolution. As the Bowie Report puts it:

<sup>1/</sup> Hans Kohn has stated, for example: "A widespread misconception still exists in Asia and Africa according to which NATO is not an alliance designed to strengthen liberal ideas in the struggle against Communism and Fascism, but something in the nature of a Holy Alliance designed to maintain as far as possible the colonial status quo of the Western powers and to counteract the struggle for freedom of the Asian and African nations." "Has NATO a Future?" NATO Letter, May 1960, page 6.




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"In the course of the Twentieth Century, the whole world order is being profoundly reshaped. For forty years the prior order has been breaking up under the impact of the forces of nationalism, war, the continued spread of the industrial revolution, and the on-rush of science and technology into whole new dimensions....

"The undermining of the prior order has about run its course. The challenge of the coming decades is how the new order to replace it will be shaped."

The conflict between the Communist and Free World blocs is only a part, albeit a large one, of the great revolutionary panorama. Within this broader setting, the East-West conflict is being waged primarily to determine which of the two contending blocs will mold the developing world according to its own concepts of order. It may well be that neither side will succeed in its objective. The forces of change may be so strong that the opposing power systems themselves will be radically altered in the course of the next several decades. But as the struggle progresses the prospects of success for both sides will depend largely upon their relative abilities to adapt their strategies to these worldwide forces.

25. A powerful element in world sentiment today is a growing demand for relaxation of the military and political tensions which may lead to nuclear war. Pressures for some form of effective arms control, in fact, appear to be strong not only in the Western and neutral world, but also in the Communist-dominated states. Whatever the Soviets' motivations, it must be said that their oft-expressed willingness to discuss such matters as disengagement, denuclearized zones, nuclear test bans, and measures for "general and complete disarmament" seems to show at least an awareness of the widespread appeal of proposals for reducing the likelihood of war. This is not meant to imply that Communist interest in such measures is humanitarian or "peace loving" in motivation. Yet it may not be




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wholly feigned. The fact that Communism is a revolutionary  
ideology should not obscure the realization that it is also a  
system of world order. In furtherance of this role the Soviet  
Union as the leader of the Communist Bloc has a very real  
problem of insuring that long-term Communist goals are not  
compromised by shortsighted concentration upon limited objec-  
tives. This kind of "larger strategic vision" has been amply  
demonstrated by the Communists in the past. It is quite  
possible that, as the threat of nuclear war increasingly adheres  
to what were formerly considered purely local issues, the  
Soviets might be genuinely willing to negotiate on certain  
stabilizing and tension-reducing measures in which both they  
and the West of necessity appear to share a common interest.

26. Both the trend toward internationalization of regional  
problems and the pressures for arms control have been accentu-  
ated by U.S. strategy over most of the past decade. Possibly  
the chief U.S. military contribution to this end has been the  
doctrine that its strategic-nuclear forces might be a pertinent  
response to military aggression originating anywhere in the  
world. In the political realm, the U.S. system of inter-  
locking alliances -- such as NATO, SEATO, the Rio Pact, the  
Anzus Pact, and U.S. participation in CENTO -- insured that a  
Communist stroke against one portion of the alliance structure  
would directly alert, and probably involve in war, other seg-  
ments of the system.


27. The aim of the U.S. has continuously been to unite the  
non-Communist world -- if not into a world order with common  
political principles, at least into international groupings  
with related military policies. The keynote of this common  
military policy has been the U.S. willingness to defend its




allies against Communist aggression. The allies, in turn, have pledged themselves to assist in their own defense and in the collective defense of each other. These joint commitments among U.S. allies have led, on the one hand, to an increased feeling of security from the possibility of Soviet aggression against themselves, and, on the other hand, to a heightened fear of being drawn into a nuclear war because of aggression against someone else.

28. The most important element in this vast collective defense structure has probably been the NATO strategy for defense of West Germany. For it is against West Germany, and particularly West Berlin, that the Soviet Union has concentrated its threats, its diplomatic pressures and its propaganda almost continuously since the end of World War II. The ultimate Soviet objectives apparently have been to bring about the complete removal of Western influence, to neutralize West Germany, and perhaps even eventually to incorporate it into the Communist Bloc. As a result, the U.S. and its allies erected their most formidable defensive capability in West Germany and backed it with the threat of nuclear retaliation for overt Soviet aggression.

29. Much of the concern with the problem of arms control has thus tended to focus on the Free World-Soviet confrontation in Germany. Should the world explode into a universally destructive war, it seems likely that Germany may be the fuse and Berlin the match. Conversely, if the Western World and the Soviet Union have in common any interests in lowering world tensions, it seems probable that these interests might best be exploited in stabilizing some of the more hazardous aspects of the German problem.



30. The problem of arms control in Germany nevertheless par- 1  
takes of the nature of a dilemma. Defense against Soviet 2  
aggression has been NATO's raison d'etre; and the military con- 3  
tribution of West Germany has become a matter of crucial impor- 4  
tance in achieving that objective. Yet one of the chief obsta- 5  
cles to arms control in Western Europe, and hence to relaxation 6  
of world tensions, appears to be Soviet hostility towards a 7  
rearmed West Germany, both as a member of NATO and as a national 8  
entity. In order to assess the relationship between the U.S. 9  
deployment in West Germany and the security of the Free World, 10  
therefore, with a view to the possibilities of arms control, 11  
it will be necessary to explore (1) the role which West Ger- 12  
many plays in U.S. military and political objectives, (2) the 13  
contribution which the U.S. deployment in West Germany makes 14  
to these objectives, (3) the relationship between the strategic 15  
objectives of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union in Europe, and 16  
(4) the implications of Soviet strategy in regard to the 17  
"German problem" for U.S. and NATO security and for the 18  
problem of arms control. 19




PART I: ROLE OF WEST GERMANY IN U.S. STRATEGY FOR EUROPE

31. The U.S. military deployment in West Germany is an out- 1  
growth of the basic U.S. political objective in the European 2  
area. This objective, for at least the past decade, has been 3  
to foster whatever indigenous capabilities appeared most prom- 4  
ising as a potential nucleus for resisting Soviet expansion 5  
into Western Europe or the Middle East. In pursuit of this 6  
objective the trend of U.S. policy has been toward an ever- 7  
greater reliance upon the power of a rejuvenated West Germany 8  
to counterbalance the threat in the eastern portion of the 9  
continent. A primary role of U.S. military forces in West 10  
Germany is to further progress toward this objective. 11

32. Of course, U.S. military forces in West Germany have 12  
other purposes. Among the most important of these are (1) to 13  
provide a militarily credible deterrent and defense against a 14  
possible Soviet attack anywhere in the NATO area, (2) to in- 15  
crease the certainty, in the minds of both the Soviets and U.S. 16  
allies, that U.S. strategic forces will intervene to prevent 17  
a Communist takeover, and (3) to stimulate the efforts of 18  
other members of NATO to make the necessary sacrifices in 19  
order to contribute to their own defense. But these purposes 20  
are largely given substance by their relationship to the po- 21  
tential role of West Germany as the focus and foundation for 22  
the defense of Western Europe. Without the territory, the 23  
cooperation, and the economic and military contribution of 24  
West Germany, a successful defense of Western Europe against 25  
a Soviet ground attack would hardly be a practicable objective. 26


33. To appreciate the significance of the current U.S. 27  
strategy vis-a-vis West Germany and the Soviet Union, it 28  
might be useful to recall the radical changes that have taken 29  
place in the relations among the former victors and vanquished 30



of World War II. There are few instances in history to rival  
the completeness of these realignments. The shift of the U.S.  
was probably the most extreme;<sup>1/</sup> within five years after the  
defeat of Germany, a U.S. decision was taken to rearm a former  
enemy against a former ally. The alteration in the foreign  
policy of the USSR, on the other hand, was probably more  
apparent than real. While the Soviets had also been profuse  
in their wartime assurances of enduring friendship and soli-  
darity with their allies, there is no evidence that they ever  
regarded these as meaningful for the future. The German nation,<sup>10</sup>  
for its part, found itself in the immediate postwar period  
prostrate and divided between the two power blows, with each  
segment at the mercy of its conqueror for both economic sus-  
tenance and political direction. Possibly even more important,  
any German hopes for eventual reunification of their divided  
nation were left chiefly dependent upon the willingness of  
the two contending Great Powers to negotiate their differences.


34. By the time of the formation of NATO in 1949 it had  
become evident that the fundamental differences between the  
two blocs were not negotiable. The Soviet Union was making  
it abundantly clear that it regarded its victory in the past  
war as a de facto readjustment of the territorial and power  
relationships of Europe, particularly in areas immediately  
adjacent to its own borders. While lip service might be paid  
to such ideas as "free elections" and "independent governments,"<sup>25</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> In 1942, Mr. Molotov was assured by Senator Connally and  
Congressman Bloom, in the name of the American Congress, that  
the enemies of the USSR were the enemies of the United States.  
Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, (New York, 1948),  
pp. 568, 585. At the same time President Roosevelt was writ-  
ing: "It will be necessary for...the Germans to earn their  
way back into the fellowship of peace-loving and law-abiding  
nations. And, in their climb up that steep road, we shall  
certainly see to it that they are not encumbered by having to  
carry guns. They will be relieved of that burden -- we hope,  
forever." Quoted in Hans Morgenthau, Germany is Our Problem,  
(New York, 1956), Appendix.



the traditional Russian preoccupation with "security" and  
"spheres of influence" appeared to be dictating Soviet poli-  
cies in Eastern and Central Europe and the Middle East.<sup>1/</sup> By  
the application of force in varying degrees, in the two or  
three years immediately following WW II, the Soviet Union  
brought under its control Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland,  
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria,  
Albania, and (for a time) Yugoslavia; it insisted on binding  
pacts with Finland; it made strong efforts to subvert the  
existing governments of Greece, Turkey, and Iran; and it  
attempted to drive the Western allies out of Berlin. By 1948  
all the Russian losses of World War I had been made good, and  
renewed attacks were being made on other political and terri-  
torial objectives which considerably antedated World War I.  
Soviet ruthlessness in pursuit of its aims, coupled with tra-  
ditional U.S. revulsion at European power politics,<sup>2/</sup> combined  
to complete the U.S. disillusionment with its former ally.  
Where only a half-decade before the U.S. had assumed that

- 1/ It has been argued that much of the U.S. disillusionment with Soviet actions after the war could be ascribed to its own failure to appreciate obvious strategic and political realities -- a failing which Churchill, according to this argument, did not share. James P. Warburg, for example, in "The Central European Crisis," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1959, page 19, states: "The important fact is that the Yalta agreement was wholly unrealistic. I thought at the time and still think that it was naive to suppose that, without any inducement such as massive aid toward reconstruction, Stalin could be brought by diplomatic skill to establish free governments -- in the Western sense of the phrase -- in countries over which he had gained absolute physical control. So far as it concerned Eastern Europe, the Yalta agreement was an attempt on the part of the West to undo by a stroke of the pen the results of the whole appeasement policy as well as the consequences of the strategic conduct of the war."
- 2/ U.S. attitudes in this respect still bore strong overtones of the Wilsonian idealism of a quarter-century before. "When Churchill in May 1944 asked if the United States would approve spheres of influence in the Balkans, with Rumania in the Russian sphere, and Greece in the British, he was following what is usually called the 'realist' tradition of power politics; and when Secretary of State Cordell Hull somewhat indignantly refused, he was true to the so-called 'idealist' Roosevelt policy which was embodied in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941." Alfred Grosser, The Colossus Again: Western Germany from Defeat to Rearmament, (New York: Praeger, 1955), page 15.






good faith and signed agreements would be a sufficient restraint 1  
upon the Soviets, by 1949 it was decided to construct a firm 2  
military alliance which would threaten outright war in the event 3  
of further Soviet aggression. 4

35. The decision to rearm the Germans was not formally made 5  
until the North Atlantic Council meeting in New York in Septem- 6  
ber of 1950, and then only at the insistence of Mr. Acheson on 7  
behalf of the United States, over objections voiced by the 8  
French and Belgians.<sup>1/</sup> Still, NATO planners had probably 9  
realized for some time that, if prescribed NATO force goals 10  
were to be met, the West Germans would have to fill the gap.<sup>2/</sup> 11  
Though fear of a rapacious Soviet Union was undoubtedly strong 12  
in Western Europe, a general unwillingness to carry the burden 13  
of rearmament alone left the members of NATO no apparent alter- 14  
native other than to accept the U.S. solution. Yet, as Ger- 15  
many's immediate neighbors, it is only natural that they 16  
should be more acutely sensitive to its implications than 17  
was the U.S. 18

36. Historically, Germany's relations with its neighbors 19  
have been such that an almost involuntary distrust of German 20  
military power seems to be a permanent element in European 21  
thinking. Since at least as far back as the Carolingian 22  
Empire and its successor the Holy Roman Empire, the Germans 23


<sup>1/</sup> Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, (Paris, 1955).  
<sup>2/</sup> As Roger Hilsman has stated: "It was not that the military  
were insisting on German rearmament out of professional admira-  
tion for the Germans or addiction to a plan that demanded Ger-  
man rather than some other kind of soldier. On the contrary,  
the military apparently felt that if the governments wanted to  
make the sacrifice, the 100 divisions could come entirely from  
the original members of NATO. After all, France alone had  
fielded over 100 divisions at the start of World War II (al-  
though this may also illustrate that mere numbers are not  
enough)." "The Developing Strategic Context," NATO and  
American Security, Ed. by Klaus Knorr (Princeton: Princeton  
Univ. Pr., 1959), page 17.



have viewed their destiny in expansive terms.<sup>1/</sup> The significance of this factor is, if anything, increased by the fact that the Germans were one of the last nations in Europe to achieve national unity. Where other countries eventually arrived at positions of at least moderate national satisfaction, the Germans seemed to be doomed to a perpetual state of political, racial and territorial frustration.<sup>2/</sup> German history has been an almost continuous symphony on the two contrasting themes of empire and particularism.


37. Current concern with the problems caused by the division of Germany should not obscure the realization that there were two Germanies even after German unification in 1870. Austria and Prussia constituted merely two poles of an intra-German conflict whose roots go back for centuries into the history of Europe. It is of significance, in this connection, that all four truly World Wars of the past two centuries (the Seven Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II) grew out of European power rivalries, and that the last two of these wars were directly related to the German drive for fulfillment of their national destiny. In short, the

- 1/ Scholars have for years speculated regarding the significance of German artistic and intellectual expressions in their relationship to German political and social ideals. (See Rohan D. Butler, Roots of National Socialism, for a pessimistic, but scholarly study.) The German penchant for vast, if seemingly unrealistic ideas, was expressed in the common saying in previous centuries that the "French inhabited the land, the British the sea, and the Germans the air." It is interesting that the German word Weltanschauung (worldview) should have been almost universally adopted to express this expansive intellectual concept. In this context, it is probably not surprising that most of the immense, all-inclusive, and fundamentally original philosophical concepts of modern times should have been the work of Germans -- e.g., of Hegel, Kant, and Marx.
- 2/ The racial aspect of this drive of the Germans for national completion has constituted what is probably its most recent and at the same time logically most inexplicable, expression. That the "typical German" has little foundation in anthropological and historical fact seemed to have little effect upon its appeal to Germans as an ideal. See, for example, Chapter I, "Who are the Germans?" in Robert H. Lowie, Toward Understanding Germany, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1954).



Europeans, and particularly the Russians, have good reason to  
be highly sensitive to the future of a nation which has proved  
such a persistent and ruthless competitor in the still un-  
finished division of the spoils from the breakup of the Astro-  
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.<sup>1/</sup> The U.S., in underwriting  
the German return to power, in the eyes of many Europeans is  
also underwriting the likelihood of a renewed contest for the  
territories and peoples of these Empires. In fact, a case can  
be made for explaining Soviet territorial expansion in Europe  
immediately after World War II in terms of this contest<sup>2/</sup> as  
much as in those of the opening phases of a campaign to con-  
quer the world for Communism. Such a thesis does not argue,  
of course, that the Soviets had no objectives at that time in-  
volving eventual world dominion, but simply that in developing  
priorities for accomplishment of these objectives they did not  
lose sight of the more immediate problem of Russian security --  
with all the historical and psychological connotations which  
the term held for them.

- 1/ The German attraction to the Middle East cannot be presumed dead. Long before World War I Moltke had written extensively on the advantages of a German move to the East, and von der Goltz had undertaken the reorganization of the Turkish Army. The Berlin to Bagdad railway was an integral component in the plans of these masters of railway strategy. Even earlier, Friedrich List, the German admirer of Adam Smith and Alexander Hamilton, had urged German expansion to the East by economic development. See Evans Lewin, The German Road to the East, (London: William Heinemann, 1916). An interesting comparison may be drawn between the economic views of List and those of Ludwig Erhard, the author of Germany's current free enterprise-oriented Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy).
- 2/ See, for example, Robert Strausz-Hupe, "The Western Frontiers of Russia," Review of Politics, July 1947, page 328: "The western frontiers of the Soviet Sphere of Influence coincide so closely with those Czarist Russia planned to draw after the defeat of the Central Powers that Czarist and Soviet policies appear to differ as regards methods only."



38. While, as was suggested earlier, the U.S. could probably  
look on the prospect of a rejuvenated and remilitarized Germany  
with more detachment than Germany's European neighbors, this is  
not to say that there was no appreciation in the U.S. of the  
potential dangers in the situation. On the contrary, at the  
conclusion of World War II the U.S. attitude toward the  
Germans had been uncompromisingly harsh. The basic policy  
directive on the objectives of the U.S. occupation stated:


"It should be brought home to the Germans that  
Germany's ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi  
resistance have destroyed the German economy and  
made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the  
Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they  
have brought upon themselves.

"Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of  
liberation but as a defeated nation.... The principal  
Allied objective is to prevent Germany from ever  
becoming a threat to the peace of the world."<sup>1</sup>

This directive stated further that economic controls might be  
imposed only if they were necessary "to protect the safety and  
meet the needs of the occupying forces" and "to prevent star-  
vation or such disease and unrest as would endanger these  
forces."<sup>2</sup> In other words, any suffering among the German  
people was well-deserved, self-inflicted, and of interest to  
the occupying authorities only if it might endanger their own  
personnel. Everything else was to be subordinated to the prin-  
cipal objective of sterilizing Germany's future potential for  
international troublemaking.

39. As the intransigent and aggressive nature of Soviet  
post-war policy became increasingly evident, the U.S. attitude  
toward West Germany changed accordingly. By the time Secre-  
tary Byrnes made his Stuttgart speech on September 1946,

1/ Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-54, edited by  
Beate Ruhm von Oppen, (London: Oxford University Press,  
1955), pages 15 and 16. Emphasis added.  
2/ Ibid., page 16.



the U.S. was beginning to make it clear that the punitive phase 1  
of the occupation was over. Actually, a radically new phase was 2  
already beginning. Even though Secretary Byrnes stated that it 3  
was "not in the interest of the German people or in the interest 4  
of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or a partner in 5  
a military struggle for power between the East and the West,"<sup>1/</sup> 6  
both portions of divided Germany rapidly assumed precisely such 7  
a position. 8

40. In implementing its decision to rebuild West Germany as 9  
a future military partner, the U.S. nevertheless followed a 10  
consistent and coherent policy -- even if the pace of "demo- 11  
cratization" and return of the West Germans to respectability 12  
as a sovereign nation was at times somewhat breathtaking.<sup>2/</sup> 13  
The substance of the U.S. policy was simply that, as West 14  
Germany regained political, economic and military strength, 15  
its interests should be integrated more and more closely with 16  
those of the West in general, and those of Western Europe in 17  
particular. The corollary of this policy was that the poli- 18  
tical, economic and military interests of the other countries 19  
of Western Europe should progressively be integrated more 20  
closely with each other. 21


1/ Quoted by Grosser, op. cit., page 37. (See Footnote 2, page 18.)

2/ The "cold war" can probably be dated from the failure of the Moscow Conference which opened on 10 March 1947 and ended two weeks later in a storm of accusations and counter-accusations between the East and West. On 12 July 1947, a new directive stated in the preamble that "an orderly and prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and prosperous Germany...." The following year Western Germany became a member of the OEEC, established in April 1948. From June 1948 to May 1949 the Berlin Blockade hardened the East-West differences. On 8 May 1949 a constituent assembly adopted the "basic law" (Grundgesetz) of the future German Federal Republic; on 16 August the first general elections were held in Western Germany, and in September the Federal Republic began to function. On 3 May 1950 the Federal Republic was invited to participate in the work of the European Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg, which was exploring the possibilities of a federal Europe. On 9 May, M. Schuman put forward his plan, later supported enthusiastically by West Germany, for pooling Western Europe's coal and steel resources.

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41. The initial, and most effective, expression of these poli- 1  
cies was in the economic field. As the second policy directive 2  
recognized, if somewhat belatedly, the prosperity of 3  
Europe was directly related to the prosperity of Germany. <sup>1/</sup> 4  
The achievements of the Marshall Plan, the European Payments 5  
Union, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 6  
(OEEC), and the Coal and Steel Community demonstrated a fur- 7  
ther and widespread realization in Europe as well as in the 8  
U.S. of the necessity for European economic cooperation. The 9  
later successes of the Common Market, EURATOM, and the Organi- 10  
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are 11  
evidence that the sense of economic community and interdepend- 12  
ence in Western European economic matters continues strong. 13  
In the past ten years the economies of Western Europe have 14  
achieved some of the highest growth rates in the world. Much 15  
of the credit for this achievement must be attributed to the 16  
Europeans' ability to cooperate with each other both in the 17  
utilization of American aid and in the integration of their 18  
economic affairs. The primary U.S. support and encouragement 19  
of this trend has increasingly been focused on cooperation 20  
among the Inner Six, in which West Germany is by far the 21  
dominant economic figure. <sup>2/</sup> Thus the clear economic objective 22

- 1/ It is interesting that, despite the experience with the repara-  
tions policies of post-World War I, the Morgenthau Plan should  
for a time have been accepted by both Roosevelt and Churchill,  
though the latter protested at first that he did not want to  
see England after the war "chained to a dead body." John  
Maynard Keynes undoubtedly wrote the classic treatise on this  
subject in his Economic Consequences of the Peace, (New York:  
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1920). "Round Germany as a central  
support the rest of the European economic system grouped itself,  
and on the prosperity and enterprise of Germany the prosperity  
of the rest of the Continent mainly depended." Page 16.
- 2/ Lincoln Gordon, in "Economic Regionalism Reconsidered," World  
Politics, Jan. 1961, p. 239, makes the following statement:  
"Our policy during the year 1960...has supported the Six vig-  
orously; it has tolerated the Seven but rather reluctantly; it  
has aimed at minimizing friction between the Six and the Seven  
as long as the Seven exist, but limiting such adjustments to  
negotiations in the GATT which preserve the most-favored-nation  
principle. It appears that Washington would view the collapse  
of the Seven with no regrets, but would view the collapse of  
the Six as a major political calamity."




of U.S. policy in Western Europe is that competing, inefficient and essentially nationalistic interests shall be gradually subordinated in the creation of a unified, interdependent and powerful European economic system. In the process, it is confidently hoped that the engine of former German military imperialism, the great German economic capability, will not only be under safe control but will add immeasurably to the strength of the West.

42. The ultimate political objective of U.S. policy for Western Europe is equally clearly the establishment of some form of European federal union. In such a union the political control over West German actions would be largely safeguarded, while at the same time such a unified entity would be vastly superior in political effectiveness to a loose cooperative league. The U.S. has consistently encouraged European tendencies toward federation, while many of the West Germans themselves have been among its strongest supporters. German enthusiasm in this respect seems to be based on a widespread, if somewhat hazy, <sup>1/</sup> conviction among the more responsible elements that their future national security and the German chances for a viable democracy are intimately related to the success of the proposals for European integration.

43. Another motivation for German support may well exist in the plausible, if less respectable, assumption that West

<sup>1/</sup> John H. Herz makes the following statement, for example, in a discussion of the attitudes of German officialdom: "Actually, discussion of European integration usually stays in the somewhat cloudy realm of generalities. German officials give the impression of not quite knowing what it implies.... One gains the impression that there are Germans who sincerely believe in the new regionalism as an instrument for peace and cooperation. But to others it may merely mean an up-to-date way of safeguarding German interests and of having them backed up effectively vis-a-vis the East, and possibly vis-a-vis the United States also." West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, Edited by Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, (Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), pp. 124-125.




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Germany will be the dominant figure in a West European federal union.<sup>1/</sup> On the other hand, General de Gaulle, also a vigorous exponent of the advantages of European integration, obviously has plans which do not accord to the West Germans such a pre-eminent position. Thus, the future of European unity could conceivably take a less encouraging turn when the Adenauer-de Gaulle rapprochement is dissolved by the disappearance from the political scene of one or both of these dominant individuals.<sup>2/</sup> Moreover, the long-standing difficulties in British foreign policy resulting from the conflicting pulls of the Continent and the Commonwealth may still not be decisively resolved, in spite of British overtures to the Common Market. While Britain's stake in the success of NATO is probably as great as that of any other nation in the Free World, the British have so far displayed little enthusiasm at the prospect of a Franco-German dominated European federation. In short, the political integration of Western Europe may prove to be a much more complex and difficult project than European economic integration.

44. U.S. military policy regarding West Germany has paralleled its economic and political counterparts. The original EDC proposals calling for an integrated European army were strongly supported by the U.S. The "agonizing reappraisal"

1/ "Just as in 1871, the loyalty of Germans to their respective principalities was merged in a new national allegiance toward a Germany led by Prussia, so today this national allegiance is being transferred to a German-led Europe." "...the Catholic element of the CDU is sometimes accused of wanting to revive the Empire of Charlemagne through a union of the Christian-Democratic governments in Western Europe." *Ibid.*

2/ For example, there are indications that some leading members of the Christian-Democratic Party in West Germany are less wedded to the idea of European Union than Chancellor Adenauer. In France, though the Christian-Democratic Party (MRP) was the principal architect of such pioneering concepts for European integration as the Schuman Plan (Coal and Steel Community) and Pleven Plan (EDC), much will depend on the amount of influence that the MRP retains after de Gaulle. Indeed, it is difficult to predict at this juncture what form the post-de Gaulle French Government will assume.





which followed EDC's rejection by the French Parliament involved both a U.S. decision in 1954 to place primary reliance on tactical nuclear weapons for meeting a Soviet ground probe, and also forthright U.S. support of a German national army. But if German military power was to be restored, it was firm U.S. policy that command and control of German forces would be exercised through the integrated staff of NATO.

45. Bonds other than the NATO command structure also tie West Germany militarily to its allies, and particularly to the U.S. Probably most important, West German popular acceptance of the revived military forces has been dependent in a large measure upon the link with the U.S. Hostility to rearmament in the Federal Republic was at first widespread and bitter. The personal popularity of Chancellor Adenauer and his close identification with U.S. policies were probably the key factors in securing eventual public support. Moreover, geographic and economic<sup>1/</sup> limitations have made allied cooperation essential for the development of West German military power. The breadth of the Federal Republic's territory varies from only 110 to 250 miles, making access to rear areas in the U.K., the Benelux countries, France, and possibly Spain for the purposes of supply and training a matter of vital necessity. Also, most of the major items of West German military equipment, such as aircraft and missiles, will have to be supplied by the U.S. and other NATO allies for several years to come. All things considered, the U.S. objective of integrating West German military power closely with that of Western Europe appears to hold out substantial hope for success, at least for the foreseeable future.

<sup>1/</sup> National Intelligence Survey 13B, West Germany, May 1959, SECRET, states: "The economy of the Federal Republic is able to support a substantial military establishment in peace but would have grave weaknesses in a general war. Of the important industrial raw materials, West Germany has practically no bauxite and is badly deficient in petroleum, iron ore, copper, lead, and zinc. West German ability to sustain a major military effort depends on access to foreign sources of food and industrial materials, and its ability to pay for them depends on the maintenance of high export levels." Page 71.

46. In sum, over the past decade the U.S. has evolved a long- 1  
range strategy which accords to West Germany an increasingly 2  
important place in the overall objective of containing the 3  
power of the Soviet Union in Western Europe and ultimately the 4  
world. This U.S. strategy, in effect, is largely a modern-day 5  
application of Britain's "balance of power" policy. Since at 6  
least the days of Cardinal Wolsey, Britain has sought to pre- 7  
vent the domination of the Continent by a single great power. 8  
Also like Britain in earlier centuries, the U.S. has turned 9  
to the Germans to supply this European strategic counterweight. 10  
The U.S. forces in West Germany constitute the shield and sup- 11  
port for the West Germans as they increase their political, 12  
economic and military power. 13

47. This U.S. policy is not without its hazards. There can 14  
be no definite assurance that the Germans will always be a 15  
cooperative and tractable ally, or that they will not seek to 16  
redress their territorial and strategic losses of the past war 17  
by adventuring under the presumed cloak of a nuclear stalemate. 18  
But parallel to its policy of restoring West German power, the 19  
U.S. has consistently bent every effort to integrate West Ger- 20  
man resources and political objectives with those of the rest 21  
of Western Europe. The U.S. strategy for the defense of the 22  
West against the Soviet Union may well hinge upon the success 23  
of this policy. 24

PART II: ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN WEST GERMANY  
IN U.S. STRATEGY

Interdependent Nature of U.S.-Free World Military Deployments

48. The U.S. military deployment in West Germany constitutes 1  
an essential component in the NATO strategy for defense of the 2  
European area against Communism. NATO strategy is based on 3  
four main principles, all of which depend largely upon the 4  
United States for their effectiveness: 5

- a. Unity of the area to be defended, 6
- b. Major reliance upon indigenous military forces, 7
- c. Physical confrontation of the enemy with military 8  
force at major danger points, 9
- d. Maintenance of a destructive retaliatory capability, 10  
and a determination to employ this capability if the Soviets 11  
should threaten to overwhelm the local defenses. 12

49. These principles are applied to the entire European 13  
area of NATO, which extends along a wide arc from Norway 14  
through Anatolia. Between these two points the military 15  
forces of the NATO powers constitute a barrier against fur- 16  
ther Soviet expansion into Alliance territory. A further 17  
interlocking alliance of the NATO powers with CENTO and 18  
SEATO forms a looser and more indirect continuation of the 19  
barrier around the flank of Southeast Asia. The Free World's 20  
immediate confrontation of the Communists along this barrier 21  
has been sustained primarily with ground troops. Mobile 22  
naval, ground, and air forces are deployed in depth at 23  
strategic points behind the barrier, while both mobile and 24  
fixed nuclear retaliatory forces, with progressively increas- 25  
ing combat range, are located at various points extending 26  
from the immediately threatened areas back to the United 27  
States itself. 28

50. U.S. strategy throughout the Free World is, in general, 1  
characterized by varying adaptations of the same four princi- 2  
ples applied in NATO. In some countries, such as Pakistan, 3  
South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan, there is equal or even 4  
greater emphasis upon indigenous forces for local defense; in 5  
other regions, such as the Middle East and parts of Southeast 6  
Asia, primary reliance for immediate defense is placed on a 7  
mobile U.S. capability. But it is U.S. global strategy to 8  
treat the entire world as an area of U.S. strategic interest, 9  
to resist local Communist aggressions as effectively and rap- 10  
idly as possible, and to pose the threat of general war in the 11  
event of any major Communist assault upon Free World security. 12  
This overall strategy has insured that a Communist attempt to 13  
"nibble" the West to death by overt but limited military 14  
attacks would be an exceedingly dangerous game. Thus, for 15  
example, the Soviets cannot attempt to change by force the 16  
Western position in Berlin without taking into consideration 17  
the entire web of Allied military deployments, which includes 18  
not only the other NATO forces but also U.S. tactical nuclear 19  
aircraft in South Korea, B-52's on airborne alert over the 20  
North American Continent, and attack carriers patrolling 21  
between Japan and the Philippines. 22

51. It was stated above that NATO's strategic principles 23  
depend largely upon the United States for their effectiveness. 24  
This is not to say that NATO is merely a "front" for the U.S. 25  
On the contrary, the fundamental basis of the Alliance is the 26  
determination of the NATO countries to resist Soviet aggres- 27  
sion through the combined efforts of the entire membership. 28  
To this end, supreme authority over the Alliance's strategy 29  
is exercised by the Council of Ministers of the member coun- 30  
tries, with the jointly manned Military Standing Group acting 31  
in an advisory capacity. In case of the outbreak of hostili- 32  
ties, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) will 33

assume command of all forces allocated by the members so that a Soviet attack against one country can in fact be responded to as an attack against all. Since, however, the national forces of the various NATO countries are stationed predominantly in their own territories, it is the integrated U.S. deployment in NATO which constitutes the primary guarantee for the validity of the principle of unity -- unity not only of NATO but of the Free World. The reasons for this are readily apparent: the U.S. military presence in NATO extends, in one form or another, physically throughout the area;<sup>1/</sup> its elements are articulated with each other and with those of the allies by an intricate communications network; U.S. financial assistance has contributed importantly to the military buildup of the other NATO countries; it is the U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability which constitutes the ultimate force behind the NATO guarantee; and it is a U.S. commander who both formally and informally is the Alliance's military head. From this viewpoint, the U.S. military presence in NATO, which has often been aptly described as the "cement" of the Alliance, might with some justice be called, in a revised metaphor, the major element of NATO's bone structure, nerve system, muscle power, and brain center.<sup>2/</sup>

- 1/ Including U.S. naval and air bases, logistical and other support facilities, Military Advisory personnel, etc.
- 2/ There is some evidence that this metaphor has literal significance for the Soviets. Apparently they feel that the U.S. has physically moved its national corporate "presence" to the European Continent, where it stands in a threatening posture directly against the body of the Soviet Union. The Soviets could not redress this situation during the first half of the past decade without the likelihood of a world war in which they would clearly have been inferior in long-range nuclear capability. Now they appear convinced that the strategic balance of power has so changed in their favor that the U.S. must accommodate its military presence to the new situation. Walter Lippmann has been insisting in a recent series of articles that the Soviet analysis is essentially correct -- that John Foster Dulles could make the old policy work by "shaking the bomb at the Soviets," and thus the U.S. could paper over its actual military incapability to enforce its will in local actions all over the world. Now, Lippman says, not only the Soviets but the U.S. and its allies know that the strategic situation has changed, and we cannot continue to conduct our foreign and military policy as if it had not.

Special Significance of the Deployment in West Germany

52. The territory of the German nation is the key sector on the NATO barrier. From a geographical standpoint it is highly susceptible to Soviet aggression. It is also an area from which the USSR itself has been especially vulnerable. Politically, economically and psychologically, the German nation and territory assume even greater significance. Militarily, the West German forces are rapidly becoming the largest European segment of the NATO defense forces. In the final analysis, it may transpire that the manner in which the West German military forces develop, as well as the political orientation of their government, may largely determine whether Western Europe is to move toward unification and strength, and hence toward a balancing position in relation to the USSR, or whether it will disintegrate into disunity and weakness, and fall an easy prey to Soviet power and influence.

53. West German military development, while plagued with many recruiting, training, and logistical problems, has made important progress since its inception in 1954-1955. The West German ground forces now total 180,000 men organized into understrength divisions of limited combat capabilities, 7-1/3 of which are already committed to NATO.<sup>1/</sup> By the end of 1961, these forces should reach 220,000, including 12 combat divisions, all of which will be committed to NATO.<sup>2/</sup> The modest West German naval force, also committed to NATO, is primarily

1/ See NIE 23-60, 22 March 1960, The Outlook in West Germany, for a more extensive discussion of West German military, political and economic prospects.

2/ Bearing in mind that the NATO goal is 30 shield divisions, it is significant that West Germany with a population of 53 million is contributing nearly one-half of that total, while England and France with nearly 100,000,000 now contribute less than a fifth of the total force goal. If the NATO goal of 30 ready divisions is not achieved, the West German force would, of course, constitute an even larger proportion.

designed to perform escort and antisubmarine duties and mine warfare, and will include a small naval air arm. Recently, the West German navy has secured an increase from 3000 to 6000 tons in the WEU-imposed tonnage restriction per vessel. The air force is designed chiefly as a tactical force, and is committed to NATO. By the end of 1961 it should contain 10 fighter-bomber squadrons, 6 tactical reconnaissance squadrons, 8 interceptor squadrons, and 5 transport squadrons, all combat-ready. German air force plans envisage a 1964 force of 60 squadrons. All indications are that the West Germans will continue to push for a more modernized military force.<sup>1/</sup> The proposed strength of the West German forces can hardly become sufficient in itself, of course, ever to be a major threat to the Soviets. But coupled with the growing German economic power and influence, the continued progress of plans for European unity, and the doubts which the Soviets must have regarding future German political reliability, the rearmament of West Germany constitutes an understandable source of concern for them. This concern would be no less real whether they see West Germany as a threat to their homeland or an obstacle to their global strategy.

54. In effect, the rapidly growing West German military capability is like a young plant which the U.S. is tending and

<sup>1/</sup> NIE 23-60, pp. 10-11, states: "Although West Germany will probably continue to procure much of its military hardware from the U.S., it will lay increasing stress on further development of its own military production base. About 60 percent of West German military procurement is currently being placed in West Germany, but there has thus far been little production of heavy armaments. In addition, the Defense Ministry is developing joint procurement with other European NATO members under which both West German and other European production facilities would be strengthened. West German industry shows increasing interest in the investment opportunities involved. To these ends, West Germany will probably continue to seek progressive elimination of the remaining WEU restrictions on its armament production... Already involved in production of various short-range tactical missiles, West Germany is interested in entering the field of longer range missiles...."

shielding until it reaches maturity. In the next three or four 1  
years the West German military forces will make major strides 2  
in improving their training, equipment, and combat capability. 3  
U.S. training and equipping of these forces in the use of 4  
nuclear weapons, should it expand beyond present arrangements, 5  
will allow the West Germans to claim an ever-increasing role 6  
both in the defense and the political affairs of Western 7  
Europe. Thus the major prize to be defended against Soviet 8  
ambitions in Europe is not necessarily such vulnerable and 9  
tempting territorial morsels as Austria, Denmark or Yugoslavia, 10  
but the West German military capability itself. 11

55. In recognition of the above fact, the U.S. has maintained 12  
its forces on a constantly ready basis to repel a Soviet 13  
attack upon West German territory. U.S. ground forces con- 14  
sist of some 230,000 personnel, organized as a field army 15  
(2 corps) of 5 divisions (3 infantry and 2 armored), 1 16  
armored group, 3 armored cavalry regiments, 2 battle groups, 17  
an artillery brigade (air defense), and numerous other combat 18  
and service support units. The five divisions are deployed 19  
throughout the U.S. sector of West Germany; the armored 20  
cavalry regiments are on constant patrol near the border; 21  
the two battle groups, with a tank company, are in West Berlin; 22  
while the artillery brigade is deployed primarily in perform- 23  
ance of its air defense function, though it also has some 24  
capability for ground warfare with its NIKE-HERCULES missiles. 25  
U.S. air forces in West Germany consist of 4 squadrons of 26  
interceptors (F-102A), 10 squadrons of fighter-bombers (F-100C 27  
and D), 2 squadrons of MACE missiles and 1 squadron of MATADOR 28  
(the latter currently converting to MACE), deployed on five 29  
bases in the western portion of the country. The air force 30  
interceptors share their air defense role with the Army's 31  
NIKE and HAWK missiles, while the fighter bombers and missiles 32

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have a defense mission which includes both the destruction  
of automatic targets (almost all of which are in the satellite  
countries), and support of the ground battle.

56. The U.S. also makes available nuclear weapons, under the  
physical control of U.S. custodial units, to a West German  
squadron of F-84's and to four RAF squadrons of CANBERRAS. In  
January 1962 another West German F-84 squadron will receive  
nuclear weapons, under the same conditions of U.S. custody.  
Nuclear weapons are similarly made available for allied ground  
forces in West Germany, with a relaxation of the control  
arrangements, in some instances, for the British. Nuclear  
storage sites are located in close proximity to the U.S. and  
allied units equipped with nuclear delivery systems. The U.S.,  
British and West German nuclear capable aircraft squadrons  
maintain aircraft on 15-minute alert with nuclear weapons  
(though the weapons for the non-U.S. units remain under physi-  
cal control of U.S. custodial personnel). A decision announced  
by SACEUR is, of course, required to release nuclear weapons  
for use by any of the NATO forces.

57. The NATO nuclear threat in West Germany is backed up by  
the much heavier retaliatory capability stationed in the U.K.,  
including not only the longer range F-101's and B-66's, but  
SAC B-47's on "Reflex" (15-minute) alert, British V-bombers,  
and IRBM's under dual U.S.-British control. Other SAC Reflex  
B-47's based in Spain and Morocco, the U.S. missile command in  
Italy (SETAF), 36 F-100's in Italy and a similar number in  
Turkey, the programmed IRBM unit in Turkey, the Sixth Fleet's  
attack carrier striking force, and the growing fleet of  
POLARIS submarines, complete the NATO-based nuclear retaliatory  
capability.

58. This brief summary of the U.S. military deployment in West Germany, and of the nuclear forces backing it up, makes it clear that the fundamental U.S. strategy for the defense of Western Europe is to deter a Soviet attack through the threat of nuclear retaliation. Should deterrence fail, then resistance is to be made as far forward as possible, nuclear weapons will probably be used, and the likelihood of all-out war, resulting either from escalation or pre-emption, then becomes a likely prospect. It is appropriate now to consider in more detail the contribution of the U.S. deployment to this overall strategy.

#### U.S. Strategy of Deterrence

59. Up to the present time, the U.S. deterrent strategy in Western Europe has apparently been successful. However strongly the Soviets may feel about the Western position in Berlin, the rearmament of West Germany, or the potential threat of the NATO Alliance, they have made no move to change these conditions by military means. For the future, unless the Soviet leadership should revise its seeming antipathy to nuclear war, the U.S. military posture in West Germany, linked as it is to other nuclear strike forces, should probably retain its capability to deter a Soviet attack.

60. This is not to ignore the fact, of course, that the U.S. deployment in West Germany is highly vulnerable to a Soviet surprise missile attack.<sup>1/</sup> While it is less vulnerable to an aircraft attack, the Soviets could have a high degree of confidence in their ability to overwhelm U.S. defenses if the aircraft attack were made at low altitude and in a heavy ECM environment.<sup>2/</sup> Still, the Soviets have little basis for

1/ See WSEG Report No. 48, "Evaluation of Attack Carrier Striking Force and Land-Based Tactical Air Forces in Limited and General War 1960-1963," 1 August 1960. Vol. V, Part II, p. 24.  
2/ See WSEG Report No. 49, "Air Defense Weapons Control Systems," 10 April 1961.

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assuming that such an attack could be launched without immediate retaliation by other U.S. and NATO nuclear forces. Almost any degree of poor coordination or delay in the various elements of the Soviet attack would further enhance the probability of nuclear retaliation, both by the U.S. and NATO forces in West Germany on stand-by alert, and (especially) by nuclear forces stationed elsewhere. A Soviet decision to launch a surprise nuclear attack on U.S. forces in West Germany would, therefore, probably be tantamount to a decision for general war -- a decision which, presumably, the Soviets would be reluctant to make. Furthermore, the nuclear devastation of Europe would probably not be a desirable objective for a would-be conqueror anxious to exploit the resources of his victims, inasmuch as it would destroy the "prize."

61. A massive Soviet conventional attack should similarly, and largely for the same reasons, be deterred by the U.S. posture in West Germany. It would be difficult for the Soviets to separate the problem of a mass conventional attack on West Germany from the problem of nuclear war. It is precisely against such a Soviet attack that the present U.S. nuclear strategy has been designed. If NATO forces were being routed in a large-scale conventional war, abandonment of them and Western Europe to their fate would require a complete and ignominious reversal of U.S. policy. Also, since the U.S. already has nuclear weapons widely distributed throughout West Germany, the Soviets could have no assurance that local commanders might not independently order use of the weapons in the chaotic and disorganized conditions attending a major defeat. Thus the possibility of general war, resulting from escalation set off either by "accidental" use or by a deliberate policy decision on the part of the U.S. Government, would have to be counted as a highly likely outcome of a massive Soviet conventional assault across the West German border.

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62. One can, of course, conceive of a blatant Soviet gamble wherein, following an all-out propaganda campaign aimed at politically neutralizing the U.S.'s NATO allies and possibly even the U.S. itself, a bold attack might be made against West Germany with the expectation that the conquest could be consummated before Western resolution had crystallized.<sup>1/</sup> Still, the Soviets can have little reason for assuming that they could thus destroy NATO's unity and will to resist an overt attack, particularly during a period of heightened tension.<sup>2/</sup> The further possibility that the U.S. itself might be immobilized by fear should be even less of an attractive gamble for the Soviets.<sup>3/</sup> The results of a mass Soviet conventional assault upon West Germany would probably be to (1) insure that the U.S. and NATO retaliatory forces outside Germany were completely alerted and safeguarded to the maximum extent possible, and (2) to give these forces a possible pre-emptive advantage in a retaliatory attack upon the Soviet Union. These probable results should operate to deter large-scale conventional-force gambles by the Soviets.

- 1/ Somewhat in the nature of the Israeli, British and French attempt at Suez, except on a much larger scale.
- 2/ Public opinion polls in the U.K. and France, for example, have shown a marked increase in attitudes favoring NATO participation during a period of sharpened East-West tension -- as in late May 1960 -- as compared with periods of apparent detente. See USIA/ORO, Post-Summit Trends in British and French Opinion of the U.S. and USSR, WE-64, June 1960, p. 15.
- 3/ Alastair Buchan makes the following statement in NATO in the 1960's, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1960), p. 45, in discussing the possibility that the U.S. might abandon its NATO partners in a crisis which threatened the destruction of the U.S.: "...the talk that has been heard recently in Europe about the 'softness' of contemporary American...policy bears no relation to the facts. Indeed, a study of trans-Atlantic relations in the past ten years shows that at every crisis, with the one exception of Suez, the principal concern of the other NATO powers has been to restrain the United States from what seemed to be too hasty action -- in Korea, in Indo-China, in Quemoy, or in the Lebanon. The 'great debates' of the last twenty years have convinced American opinion that the integrity of Western Europe is a vital American interest, that 'capitalism in one country' could not survive. The fact that the defense of Europe might now invoke great damage for the United States is most unlikely to inhibit her from action."

63. A limited conventional attack upon West Germany (if such an attack be defined as one not powerful enough to overwhelm the NATO forces there) would similarly appear to offer little advantage to the Soviets. If the NATO forces maintained the war on a conventional basis, the Soviets could apparently look forward to a long, drawn-out limited war in which (1) they would bear the onus for aggression in the court of European and world opinion, and (2) the possibilities for escalation of the conflict into a nuclear catastrophe would always be present with all the afore-mentioned disadvantages of alerting, and possible pre-emption by, U.S. retaliatory forces. The more the Soviets strove for a quick initial victory<sup>1/</sup> by increasing the size of forces used in the attack and by making more unambiguous their purpose, the more evident would be their guilt in the aggression and the more likely the chances of escalation. Moreover, if the experience of the Korean attack has any significance as a precedent, the effect of a Soviet limited assault on West Germany would probably be to drive the U.S. and its Western European allies into a rapid and extensive mobilization -- a mobilization which psychologically and militarily might be so massive as to require years of lessened tensions before it began to reverse itself. Thus if the Soviets are at all serious about their often expressed desires to relax the pressures of the current military confrontation and to best the capitalist countries in a struggle of the respective ideologies in "peaceful coexistence," a limited military assault against the West German bastion would appear to be one of the worst possible courses of action.

64. Evaluation of the deterrent effect of the U.S. posture in West Germany on possible Soviet political-military action

<sup>1/</sup> By a lightning thrust, for example, of several mechanized divisions supported by strong tactical air forces.

against West Berlin must be more tentative. From a military standpoint, of course, the Western forces in West Berlin, per se, offer little threat to the Soviet military forces. But they do insure that U.S. forces will be involved immediately in a Soviet military attack against the Western sector of the city. The Soviets would, as a result, have to count on a high probability of intervention by other U.S. forces, with all the potential consequences. This factor alone should be sufficient to deter a Soviet military attack on West Berlin.

65. Two additional problems exist for the allies, however, in the Berlin situation. In the first place, if the Soviets should attempt a sudden grab of West Berlin, it is quite possible that the beleaguered garrison could not be relieved, as an allied attack against Soviet forces in East Germany, with presently constituted forces, would have no great chance of success. Secondly, the political implications of the problem might be quite different from those present in merely resisting an attack on West Germany itself. While the support of the West German forces would undoubtedly be forthcoming, both the capability and willingness of the other NATO powers to mount an invasion of East Germany might be more doubtful, in the face of Soviet threats of nuclear destruction. The most effective deterrent to a sudden Soviet military grab of West Berlin probably continues to be the threat -- explicit or implicit -- of nuclear retaliation. But here again the U.S. confronts the question of the resolution of its European allies -- namely, their willingness to resort to nuclear war in defense of Berlin. The inescapable fact is that West Berlin, because of its geographical isolation, does not constitute a traditional problem of defense such as that represented by the U.S. position in West Germany. To this extent the basic NATO strategy for the defense of Western Europe, which assumes a credible and substantial resistance capability, does not really apply to the situation in Berlin.

66. So far the Soviets seem to have been deterred from military action against West Berlin because of the possibility that any action against the Western position could lead to general war. But there can be no such confidence that they will be similarly deterred from taking other nonmilitary measures which might constitute a major threat to the present Western political and military position in Berlin. If the Soviets actually concluded a treaty with East Germany, and the West were faced with a choice of either dealing with the East Germans as sovereign or else of handling the problem of continued access to West Berlin on the basis of force, NATO would face a grave military problem. All the difficulties discussed in the paragraph above would still be present, with an even greater question regarding the willingness of the European members of NATO to risk nuclear war in a situation where NATO had not been overtly attacked.

67. While the Soviets are clearly aware that the Berlin situation is fraught with grave risks for both sides, they undoubtedly have major incentives to see that some action is taken soon to "normalize" what is obviously a serious obstacle to their plans for the stabilization of Eastern Europe. Not only is West Berlin a show-window of non-Communist political and economic freedom and a continual affront to the Soviet claims of dominance over Eastern Europe, but it is also a running sore through which the hopes and realities of escape from the Communist sector have been kept inflamed.<sup>1/</sup> Until the Berlin issue is settled, the Soviet "locomotive of history" is

<sup>1/</sup> "More than 3,000,000 people went from East to West Germany during 1949-60, and only about 650,000 went in the opposite direction. The westward flow diminished sharply in 1958, after the enactment of an East German law forbidding 'flight from the republic,' but rose again in 1960 to almost 200,000 because of the collectivization of agriculture and the growing fear that the border would be closed.... The emigrants have included every element of the East German population, but proportionally there have been more managerial and professional groups and fewer peasants." CIWS, 11 May 1961, Special Articles, page 10.

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apparently moving at reduced speed, both in Europe and in the  
rest of the world, all because of a problem which the Soviets  
insist was actually settled sixteen years ago.

68. From a legal standpoint, the Western position in Berlin  
depends upon the original quadripartite agreements in 1944 and  
1945, plus the agreement of 1949 which terminated the Soviet  
Blockade. The U.S. has rejected flatly every attempt of the  
Soviets to alter the basis for the Western occupation, knowing  
that any succeeding rights must be more tentative and subject  
to renegotiation than the existing ones. Yet as time passes  
the logical basis for these rights may become less and less  
distinct and the advisability of an up-to-date settlement  
more appealing. West Berlin exists today as a potentially  
unstable Western creation, subjected to strongly conflicting  
pressures. On the one hand, it has naturally close connections  
with the physical area in which it is located; on the other, it  
is economically and politically dependent upon West Germany,  
which constantly reiterates that it is to be the eventual capi-  
tal of a reunited Germany. The West German Government makes

- 1/ The Soviets are becoming increasingly insistent that World War II effectively settled the frontiers of Europe, that allied agreements made at that time regarding treatment of Germany have been flouted, and that a peace treaty must be signed immediately before the "cancerous" situation becomes worse. The recent Soviet Memorandum on a German Peace Treaty, while surprisingly mild toward the U.S., focused the brunt of its anger on West Germany for violating the former agreements: "The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany openly expresses its negative attitude to them (the agreements), fosters saber rattling militarism and comes out for a revision of the German frontiers, a revision of the results of World War II." New York Times, June 12, 1961.
- 2/ The peculiar nature of West Berlin's present status can be seen to some extent in its abnormal percentage of aging persons, its high proportion of women, the falling birth rate, and the low percentages of persons in the reproductive age groups. See Intelligence Report No. 8321, "The Population Crisis of West Berlin," Department of State, August 15, 1960. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN.
- 3/ The West German Government regularly held its opening Bundestag meeting in West Berlin until September 8, 1960, in order to maintain this symbolic link. Khrushchev, during a press conference in Vienna in 1960, intimated that the Soviet Union might sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany should this practice continue. The U.S. and West Germany initially favored calling the Soviet bluff, but gave way before pressure from the French and the British. See "Relationship Between Bonn and Berlin," Current Foreign Relations, Department of State, July 20, 1960, pp. 10-11.



every effort to heighten Berlin's dependence upon it, and  
resists every move which might remotely imply that the city is  
not actually and potentially an integral part of free Germany.  
Major contributions to the Federal Republic's cause have been  
made by West German and other Western European business firms,  
who have been lured by the pool of skilled labor, the special  
tax advantages, and a faith in the "no-surrender" future of the  
city, to expand their operations in Berlin.<sup>1/</sup>

69. The Soviet concern in Berlin seems to be at least as  
much that the West Germans shall not have the city as it is  
that the Communists shall have it. In fact, if the Soviet  
suggestion of a "free city" status even approaches sincerity,  
then it is obvious that their immediate objective is the de-  
struction of the link between Berlin and the West, and especially  
between Berlin and West Germany.<sup>2/</sup> But the Soviet proposals  
attempt to obscure the fact that Berlin is not an appendage  
of Germany which can be cocooned off as was Danzig. On the  
contrary, Berlin is a vital political, economic and cultural

<sup>1/</sup> See, for example, "Siemens Expanding under Nose of Reds,"  
Business Week, October 17, 1959, p. 184. The House of Siemens,  
West Germany's leading electrical-equipment manufacturer and  
also its largest single manufacturer, even ahead of the giant  
Krupp combine, has put one-third of its total capital outlays  
since 1948 (over \$100 million) into West Berlin. Other com-  
panies have followed Siemens' lead: Switzerland's counterpart  
of Siemens -- Brown, Boveri & Cie., Daimler-Benz, Bayer, and  
F. W. Woolworth.

<sup>2/</sup> Ever since Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the Soviet  
diplomatic attack on the West and the treatment of the German  
and Berlin issues have undergone a certain change. The former  
overt attack on the presence of Western troops in Berlin epi-  
tomized in the standard demand to transform West Berlin into  
"a demilitarized Free City," has been absent. Instead of the  
"demilitarized Free City," he spoke of the "Free City" at the  
National Press Club in Washington, D.C., September 16, 1959; in  
Budapest, December 1, 1959; and in Moscow, January 14, 1960.  
The West Germans, especially Mayor Brandt and some of his close  
advisors, have been quick to warn that the new tactic is designed  
to sever the link between the Federal Republic and West Berlin.  
Der Tag, (Berlin), December 24, 1959, stated: "Khrushchev has  
learned something in the last few months....His attack is no  
longer directed against the rights and the presence of Allied  
troops but against the rights and the presence of the Federal  
Republic in the German Capital." See Hans Speier, The Soviet  
Threat to Berlin, RAND Study P-1912-1, April 15, 1960.

organ of the German corporate structure, as well as a symbol  
of the NATO commitment to the freedom of Western Europe.

70. In summary, while the Soviets are probably deterred from  
military action against West Berlin, they may well be serious  
about undertaking nonmilitary measures which may force upon  
NATO itself the onus of initiating military action. The U.S.  
military deployment in West Germany is not designed to deter  
such a Soviet move, and cannot be expected to accomplish such  
deterrence. Should the Soviet actions be successful, they  
could have unpredictable consequences for the unity of the  
Western Alliance.

If Deterrence Fails--

71. Whatever the success of the deterrent strategy in the  
past, the U.S. can have no assurance that the Soviet Union will  
continue to be inhibited from overt military action against  
West Germany. Hence the U.S. posture in West Germany must be  
prepared for any of several possible courses of Soviet mili-  
tary action. On the spectrum of military possibilities, those  
which involve variations of a Soviet all-out nuclear attack  
against U.S. forces in West Germany will not be considered here  
in detail. Even a poorly coordinated surprise missile attack  
would probably result in the destruction of the greatest part of  
the U.S. deployment in the NATO area. <sup>1/</sup> The primary U.S.

<sup>1/</sup> WSEG Report No. 48, Vol. V, Part II, p. 24, states, regarding  
the survival of U.S. land-based aircraft in USAF: "In the  
event of a daytime surprise missile attack with no strategic  
warning, it is considered improbable that more than  
a small fraction of the aircraft force (less than 10 percent  
of the total force) could be launched even if the enemy's  
missile arrivals are spread over a 20-minute period. In  
the face of a surprise missile attack under nighttime con-  
ditions, the possible number of aircraft launched in USAF  
in 1961 would be about three-quarters of the aircraft  
launched as a result of a daytime attack." The Soviet  
capability to destroy other types of fixed installations  
would probably be comparable to that indicated above.

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defense against a Soviet attack of this nature would undoubtedly be the less vulnerable retaliatory forces stationed elsewhere, such as POLARIS submarines, attack carrier aircraft, and other surviving strategic forces in CONUS and other parts of the world.

72. However, a major Soviet conventional attack against West Germany is a possibility which U.S. strategy must seriously contemplate. The chief threat is assumed to be the 20 Soviet divisions in East Germany, with some possible assistance from an estimated six additional Soviet divisions in Poland and Hungary. A massive Soviet buildup and mobilization for attack, to the extent of 50-100 divisions or more, is of course also a possibility, though such an operation would be almost certain to give the West strategic warning and would thus have a much higher probability of triggering an all-out strategic nuclear exchange. But if the Soviets became convinced that the Western powers would be unwilling to convert a limited war into an all-out war, it is possible that they might gamble on a sudden thrust at West Germany with a view to humiliating NATO and demonstrating the weakness of the U.S. guarantee. A particular variant of this threat might be a Soviet drive into the northern sector of West Germany, where there are no U.S. forces stationed and where a NATO counterattack dependent largely on U.S. forces would be required to recover the lost territory and to assist the other NATO forces already engaged.

73. The possibility must also be considered of a Soviet smash-through into north Germany, intended not merely to grab a small amount of territory and hold it, but as the opening phase of a strategy approximating the Schlieffen Plan. In other words, with only minimal Soviet forces holding to the south, a powerful mechanized force might attempt to drive through north

Germany and the low countries into France, cutting the line  
of communications of the U.S. forces poised in Germany and  
isolating them in the heart of Europe. It would probably be  
difficult for the NATO forces with their present capabilities  
to resist successfully such a Soviet move. The most effective  
military response by NATO would very likely be nuclear retaliation  
by the air forces in West Germany and the U.K. If the  
allies were reluctant to use nuclear weapons, then it probably  
should be assumed that there will be an insufficient Western  
defense capability against such a Soviet attack, short of a  
major conventional buildup of NATO forces in north Germany.

74. A Soviet drive into central Germany, through an area such  
as the Fulda Gap, would engage U.S. forces immediately. Against  
a large-scale attack, NATO, according to present doctrine,  
would probably use both ground and air nuclear weapons. The  
results of such a NATO defense would probably be to insure  
(1) that the Soviets could not win an easy tactical victory,  
and (2) that a major nuclear war would probably follow any  
such Soviet provocation.

75. The possibilities of successfully defending West Berlin  
against a Soviet military attack have already been discussed.  
West Berlin is, per se, indefensible. The U.S.'s chief hopes  
for maintaining its position there seem to be (1) deterrence  
of Soviet aggression by the threat of nuclear war, or (2) dip-  
lomatic negotiations which might reduce the Soviet concern  
about the city and at the same time not weaken the substance  
of Western rights.

76. In sum, the U.S. forces in West Germany, in company with  
other NATO forces, could very possibly resist a substantial  
Soviet conventional attack, particularly if the attack were  
against the area held by U.S. forces. A Soviet attack to the

north of the U.S. sector would pose a much greater defensive  
problem. West Berlin would be impossible to hold against a  
determined Soviet assault. U.S. forces in West Germany would  
have little chance of effectively defending themselves against  
an all-out Soviet nuclear attack in which missiles and dense  
quantities of aircraft were used. The ultimate resort of the  
U.S. defensive strategy in Germany is the strategic forces  
stationed elsewhere, with their threat of all-out nuclear  
war against the Soviet homeland.

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PART III: ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLITICAL-MILITARY OBJECTIVES  
VIS-A-VIS THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

77. From the earlier analysis it is apparent that U.S. political strategy has two primary objectives in the European area:

a. "Containment" of the Soviet Union, or prevention of its extending its influence farther into Western Europe and the Middle East;

b. A simultaneous buildup of a counterbalancing center of power in a unified Western Europe, with West Germany as its economic and military core.

78. A corollary aspect of the first objective is the U.S. rejection of Soviet claims to political dominance over the territory absorbed by it since the end of World War II. Three subordinate U.S. policies stem from this rejection: (1) refusal to recognize the status quo in Eastern Europe, and particularly in East Germany, as either legitimate or permanent; (2) obstruction, at least by passive means, of Soviet attempts at political consolidation of its gains in Eastern Europe; and (3) keeping open the possibility of actually weakening Soviet influence in the territories it has already absorbed, with a distant hope of eventually even bringing about a Soviet withdrawal.<sup>1/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> There has been much less said by U.S. spokesmen in recent years, particularly since the Hungarian repression, regarding the possibilities of "rolling back" the Soviet curtain over Eastern Europe. However, the present U.S. military deployment and strategy were devised when the possibilities of forcing Soviet concessions through the pressure of military strength were considered real, and the U.S. has never specifically disclaimed this policy. Certainly the Soviet leaders have made it very clear that they regarded U.S. talk of "positions of strength" as implying an aggressive purpose. Such statements as the following by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson laid the basis for this interpretation of U.S. policy:

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79. The second major U.S. objective above also has two  
corollaries: (1) to tie West Germany so intimately and in-  
extricably into the Western European community that the  
chances of future German military adventuring will be reduced  
to a minimum; and (2) while assisting in the political,  
economic and military restoration of Western Europe, to keep  
individual European countries from damaging U.S. relations  
with the underdeveloped areas of the world by (a) colonialist  
power policies, or (b) so widening the gap between the eco-  
nomic and political interests of the developed and under-  
developed countries that the latter become increasingly easy  
prey for anti-Western propaganda.

80. Soviet political objectives in Europe, on the other  
hand, appear to be as follows--and in this order of immediacy,  
if not necessarily of importance:

a. Elimination of the present basis for allied rights  
in Berlin. If the Soviets could accomplish this objective,  
even without any changes in the military situation for the  
moment, the entire Western position in Berlin would be  
changed from a matter of right to a matter of negotiation.  
This is the all-important first step pursuant to the ap-  
parent ultimate Soviet objectives of (1) removing allied  
and West German influence in Berlin, (2) absorbing West  
Berlin into the East German sector with all the far-  
reaching political, economic and cultural implications

(Footnote 1/ continued from preceding page)

1/ "...what we must do is to create situations of strength; we must  
build strength; and if we create that strength, then I think that  
the whole situation in the world begins to change...with that  
change there comes a difference in the negotiating positions of  
the various parties, and out of that I should hope that there  
would be a willingness on the side of the Kremlin to recognize  
the facts...and to begin to solve at least some of the dif-  
ficulties between East and West." U.S. Senate, Military  
Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on  
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd  
Congress, 1st Session. (Washington: GPO, 1951), p. 2083.

of this act, <sup>1/</sup> and (3) establishing the basis for a permanently divided Germany--or at least a Germany divided as long as its unification might constitute a danger to the Soviet Union.

b. Securing de facto allied, and especially West German, acceptance of the present Soviet sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

c. Establishment of a buffer zone between this sphere of influence and Western military forces, in order (1) to remove the unsettling effect of Western military forces upon potentially restive elements in the satellites, and (2) to lessen the possibility of involuntarily triggering a nuclear war.

d. Prevention of a further increase in West German military, economic and political power and influence.

1/ It is difficult to overestimate the significance of Berlin to the Germans. It is not just a city of three and a quarter million people, of whom two and one-quarter million live in West Berlin. Berlin was not only the political capital of the German Reich, but it was the sentimental and historical symbol of successful German unity and nationalism--just as Weimar was the scorned symbol of their failure. And unity and nationalism in Germany, since at least the days of the failure of the 1848 Revolution at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, have been the hope and dream of the liberals rather than of the reactionaries. Thus, the significance of Berlin as a symbol of German unification is heightened by its traditional appeal to democratic elements as opposed to the authoritarian and particularistic interests. Moreover, in the theater, opera, literature, fashion and intellectual life, Berlin has been the pride of Germany. The great Berlin historians alone constitute a group of scholars unmatched in most countries; e.g., Niebuhr, Ranke, Treitschke, Droysen, Mommsen, Troeltsch, Delbruck, and Meinicke. In many ways Berlin has filled in Germany a role which could only be approximated in the U.S. by a combination of the characteristics of New York City, Washington, D.C., and a major university city. When Berlin's economic power and skilled working class are added to the picture, it becomes apparent that the permanent loss of Berlin by West Germany would be a material and psychological catastrophe for the West and an immense coup for the Communists. See, e.g., John Mander, Berlin: The Eagle and the Bear. (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1959.)



e. Disruption of wider efforts in Western Europe toward political, economic and military strength and unity, and particularly disruption of the NATO Alliance.

f. Separation of the interests of the Western European countries from those of the former colonial areas, and those of the underdeveloped countries in general, in order to speed the expansion of Communist influence in these areas.

81. If this listing of Soviet political objectives in Europe is essentially correct, it would seem that from the Soviet viewpoint these objectives are predominantly defensive in nature. Obviously, however, the U.S. regards its own political objectives in Europe as wholly defensive.<sup>1/</sup> Conversely, a comparison of the two sets of objectives also indicates that each of the two sides regards the political objectives of its opponent as offensive, rather than defensive. The crux of this U.S.-Soviet conflict in political viewpoint lies in the divergent views of the two blocs regarding the nature of the status quo in Europe.

82. For the Soviets the status quo is merely a way-station on the predetermined path of time. Yet Marxist theory makes it clear that this historical path is not straight. In fact, by the inexorable laws of existence, the path cannot be straight, but must find its way dialectically. As the dialectic unfolds, the classless society gradually and irresistibly realizes itself from the world historical process, in the manner of Hegel's "world spirit." Viewed from this standpoint, the status quo in Eastern and Central Europe

<sup>1/</sup> Even those U.S. strategic objectives which have to do with altering the territorial status of the countries behind the Iron Curtain may properly be termed defensive, in the sense that they represent a continued rejection of the results of past Soviet aggression.

obviously represents only a temporary halt, an unfinished  
development, a dialectical jog in the great sweep of history.  
The forces seeking to resist, or even worse, reverse this  
process are by definition aggressive and reactionary. Commu-  
nist dogma regarding this historical development is reinforced  
by the providential fact that the present Soviet sphere of  
influence largely coincides with long-sought Russian ter-  
ritorial objectives. Thus traditional Russian concepts of  
"security" go hand in hand with the teachings of Marx and  
Lenin to brand the Western resistance to Soviet objectives  
in Europe as aggressive warmongering.

83. For the U.S. and the non-Communist countries of Europe,  
on the other hand, the status quo represents simply the last  
perilous point on the road of retreat at which Soviet im-  
perialism has been temporarily halted. Any relaxation of  
Western resistance, it seems clear, will allow the forces  
of aggression to resume their course.

84. Though the two opposing power blocs see each other's  
political objectives as aggressive, it would appear that  
neither could justify terming its opponent's military objec-  
tives in Europe as aggressive--at least over the period of  
the past decade. Neither side has attacked the other;  
neither has marshalled its forces to launch such an attack;  
and both have shown considerable restraint when war seemed  
imminent. For example, even though the Soviets attempted to  
drive the allies out of West Berlin by a passive blockade,  
they made no move to destroy by military means the airlift

which circumvented that blockade.<sup>1/</sup> The U.S., similarly, made  
 no attempt to intervene militarily in Hungary even when its  
 policies and aspirations regarding revolt behind the Iron  
 Curtain seemed to be paying off with an apparently unexpected  
 success. It is true that each side has described the military  
 posture of its opponent as aggressive, but the actual basis  
 for these accusations, which is probably recognized by both  
 sides, would seem to be that both sides support their defen-  
 sive strategic objectives with offensive military systems.  
 Thus the Soviets have emphasized armored forces and massive  
 firepower in their East German deployment, but have shown  
 no eagerness to provoke incidents which would require the  
 use of these forces.<sup>2/</sup> The U.S. has emphasized the retaliatory

1/ One can, of course, only speculate about the reasons for  
 the Soviet restraint. Very probably an important consider-  
 ation was the fear of unleashing a nuclear war. At least,  
 U.S. strategy in Europe has consistently been based upon  
 the premise that such a fear on the part of the Soviets does  
 in fact exist. But whatever the cause, even in the Stalin  
 period and before the attack on South Korea, Soviet military  
 strategy in Europe was not offensive, while that of the U.S.  
 was clearly defensive. The authors of Protracted Conflict,  
 for example, include the following citation: "As W. Phillips  
 Davison points out in a definitive RAND Corporation Study on  
 the Berlin Blockade, 'Though the Soviets continued their  
 threats to limit flying in the corridors or to close them  
 entirely, these threats clearly failed in their purpose.'  
 According to Mr. Davison, a 'responsible officer' said that  
 the United States fliers would ignore any Soviet declaration  
 barring flights in the corridors and added: 'The only way  
 they could stop us is to shoot us down.'" The Berlin Blockade:  
 A Study in Cold War, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1958),  
 pp. 154-155. The Soviets were obviously unwilling to go to  
 the length of shooting down aircraft in order to gain their  
 objective.

2/ This distinction between offensive and defensive strategic  
 military objectives, as opposed to offensive or defensive  
 military tactics, is an important one. For example, a care-  
 ful reading of the history of the German General Staff leaves  
 little doubt that their strategic objectives were, in general,  
 defensive--at least until the time of Hitler. The General  
 Staff viewed Germany as surrounded by dangerous enemies who  
 might at any time join forces and attack. A two-front war  
 was the General Staff's especial dread, and they evolved  
 strategies and tactics which would facilitate the crushing  
 of one of these fronts as quickly as possible after the  
 beginning of hostilities. On the other hand, the strategic  
 objectives of many guerrilla forces, such as the FLN in  
 Algeria, are offensive, though their tactics are usually  
 defensive.

role of its tactical nuclear forces, but has made it clear, 1  
probably even to the Soviets, that this capability is not part 2  
of an offensive strategy. 3

85. In short, the U.S.'s political objectives are defensive, 4  
it views the political objectives of the Soviets as offensive, 5  
and it has therefore pursued defensive military objectives 6  
backed by an offensive nuclear capability. The Soviet Union 7  
apparently sees its own political objectives as defensive, 8  
those of the U.S. as offensive, and has similarly pursued 9  
defensive military objectives backed by offensive military 10  
supporting systems.

86. Schematically, this picture appears somewhat as follows: 11

<u>U.S.</u>			<u>SOVIET UNION</u>		
<u>Views as</u>	<u>Political Objectives:</u>	<u>Viewed by USSR as</u>	<u>Views as</u>	<u>Political Objectives:</u>	<u>Views as</u>
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E	of Western	F	F	Political	E
F	Position in	F	F	Dominance of	F
E	Berlin	E	E	Eastern	E
N	2. Military and	N	N	Europe	N
S	Political	S	S	2. Continuation	S
I	Rebuilding	I	I	of Communist	I
V	of West	V	V	Revolution in	V
E	Germany	E	E	Europe and	E
	3. Western			Underdeveloped	
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	Unity				
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88. Though the dominant element in the U.S. strategy for the military defense of Western Europe (including West Berlin) has been the threat of nuclear war, the strategy is not an all-or-nothing concept. U.S. political safeguards on the use of nuclear weapons insure that there will at least not be an immediate all-out nuclear response to a very limited Soviet aggression. There are no U.S. nuclear weapons, for example, in West Berlin. The three armored cavalry regiments patrolling the border of West Germany, backed by two infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and another infantry division in reserve, all in a high state of combat readiness and capable of considerable conventional firepower, allow a credible nonnuclear response to a substantial Soviet conventional attack. In an actual combat situation, of course, the Soviets would also be faced with additional resistance from the West German divisions, the equivalent of two to three British divisions, and other NATO forces such as the French, Canadian, Belgian, and Dutch.<sup>1/</sup> The reliance to be placed on these forces is, however, problematical because of limitations in manning, training, equipment, logistical back-up, and overall combat readiness. Still, nothing short of a massive Soviet invasion, would require that the NATO response be a nuclear one. NATO has not committed itself in any way, however, to answer a conventional assault with a conventional defense. On the contrary, it has placed primary reliance on nuclear weapons and it has deployed nuclear weapons in forward and readily available locations so that they can be used instantly if approval is given through command channels. Thus even a limited Soviet attack raises the immediate danger of nuclear war.

<sup>1/</sup> For a complete breakout of NATO forces, and an assessment of their state of readiness, see the NATO Blue Book, Report on the 1960 Annual Review and the NATO Defense Outlook, Office of the Defense Advisor, USRO, Paris, France; January 1961.

PART IV: IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICTING SOVIET-U.S. OBJECTIVES  
FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMS CONTROL.

89. The present U.S. military deployment in West Germany, 1  
and its direct link to the retaliatory forces stationed else- 2  
where which back it up, are the expression of a strategy 3  
whose key concept was not arms control but the deliberate 4  
absence of arms control. Through the threat of unlimited 5  
retaliatory destruction the U.S. apparently brought about a 6  
major shift in the Communists' use of military force to 7  
support their expansionistic objectives. In fact, the U.S. 8  
deterrent strategy has facilitated a major redrawing of the 9  
map of political power in Europe. The successes of the 10  
strategy, however, have not been without their problems-- 11  
problems which appear to be on the increase. 12

90. In the first place, the U.S. reliance upon nuclear 13  
weapons to deter a Soviet attack upon Western Europe, or to 14  
defend Western Europe if an attack is not deterred, has ap- 15  
parently increased world pressures for arms control. Fears of 16  
accidental war, fears of the presumed incentive to pre- 17  
emption by both sides, fears of escalation, and fears of 18  
the results of general war have all been aggravated by the 19  
spring-gun nature of NATO's military posture. While there 20  
is general support in the West for the necessity of such a 21  
strategy, there appears also to be an almost universal wish 22  
that the necessity would disappear. 23

91. As a result, in the current "struggle for the minds of 24  
men" between the Communist and Free World blocs, any appeal 25  
which either side can make to the widespread desires for 26  
"general and complete disarmament" becomes a powerful politi- 27  
cal weapon. By the same token, if the military tensions 28  
threatening nuclear war must continue, the side which can be 29  
made to appear primarily responsible for them is at a 30

disadvantage in the propaganda battle. For this reason both sides have made special efforts to demonstrate that their strategic intentions are wholly defensive. Yet it must be admitted that the U.S. is handicapped to some extent in this propaganda contest, at least among the neutrals of the world, because of the very presence of its military forces on the European continent.<sup>1/</sup> This disadvantage in appealing to world public opinion is aggravated by the continuing Western necessity to counter superior Soviet conventional strength by a much advertised capability for mounting a nuclear riposte.

92. The U.S. deterrent strategy also carries with it other difficulties for the West:

a. For the strategy to be effective, the Soviets must be convinced that it is not a bluff--a conclusion not immediately self-evident, since it could entail great destruction for the U.S. itself, as well as for Europe and the USSR. The strategy's efficacy as a deterrent is also dependent upon the Soviet assessment of the U.S. allies' willingness to go through with it. If there should arise significant doubts among the Soviets regarding the West Germans' stomach for a nuclear war fought on their territory, or regarding the intention of the British to allow

<sup>1/</sup> The "plague on both your houses" attitude of many Indians during the Korean War was often expressed in the question, "Whose troops are five thousand miles from home?"; apparently this question removed, for its askers, much of the pertinence from the argument over who attacked whom to start with. This peculiar and, to the Westerner, irritating combination of political blindness and moral sanctimoniousness with which India has viewed the Communist-Western conflict is probably to a large extent an expression of residual anti-colonialism. As such, it has something of a counterpart in the attitudes of many other neutrals. But India is probably the chief hope for democracy in Asia, while such nations as Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, and an increasing number of Latin American countries are becoming a major reliance of the West, not as political or military allies, but as islands of independence from the Soviet bloc.

U.S. strike forces to launch from bases in that country, 1  
then the U.S. might run the risk of threatening a strategy 2  
in Europe which, when the chips were down, it would be 3  
unable to implement. The Soviets would then be free to 4  
engage in some brinkmanship of their own with the expecta- 5  
tion that the higher they raised the likelihood of armed 6  
conflict, the lower might be the European willingness to 7  
invite self-destruction. Thus for the U.S. deterrent 8  
strategy in Europe to continue to be successful there must 9  
remain a substantial conviction on the part of the U.S. 10  
itself, of its European allies, and of the Soviet Union 11  
that the strategy will be put into effect in the event of 12  
Soviet aggression. 13

b. The almost inconceivable implications of a general 14  
nuclear war, furthermore, have in themselves provoked mis- 15  
trust and political instability within the Western 16  
Alliance. The very "last resort" nature of the deterrent 17  
strategy has, on the one hand, made each participating 18  
nation insistent that it not be committed to nuclear war- 19  
fare on an issue which it considers less than vital to 20  
itself. On the other hand it has raised doubts among 21  
some allies whether the U.S. would commit its own 22  
strategic-nuclear forces on an issue below the threshold 23  
of U.S. national survival. These mutual doubts and fears 24  
have created a paradoxical situation wherein the military 25  
strategy whose aim is the preservation of Eastern European 26  
integrity and unity has become a factor in disrupting 27  
that unity. As a result the U.S. and its allies are 28  
able to proceed only a limited distance toward the re- 29  
moval of all doubts regarding their willingness to use 30  
nuclear weapons before they must turn and issue reassur- 31  
ances that such weapons will not be employed in haste. 32



At the same time, in attempting to demonstrate both their  
capability and willingness to fight a limited, conventional  
war, they must immediately make it clear that the nuclear  
guarantee is not being withdrawn.

c. A third and related problem is the brittleness of  
the deterrent strategy. Should it ever be challenged and  
found wanting, either because it actually was a bluff or  
because of lack of unity among the NATO allies, the con-  
sequences for the U.S. objectives in Europe would undoubtedly  
be catastrophic. It is here that the Berlin crisis prob-  
ably has its most disturbing implications. If, for example, Khrushchev should carry on from now until the end of the  
year a carefully planned "carrot and stick" campaign,  
alternately concentrating first on the sweet reasonable-  
ness and nonaggressiveness of his plans for Berlin, and  
then on the terrible consequences for the European nations  
if NATO first uses military force against East Germany,  
the U.S. may see the firm resolve of some of its allies  
slowly drain away. Once the U.S. guarantee to Europe is  
put on the line on a major issue and then withdrawn, the  
entire NATO structure probably would crumble. Yet if it  
should appear to the Soviets that the unity and resolve  
of NATO were likely to hold firm, they can as always in  
the past exercise the option of easing the crisis, and,  
while waiting for a more opportune time, claim credit for  
safeguarding world peace. This latter Soviet option  
should not, however, obscure the very real possibility  
that this time the Soviets are in deadly earnest, that they  
are not bluffing, and that they will meet force with force  
instead of backing down before the eyes of the world.

93. The Western Alliance is thus faced with a dilemma wherein its choices appear to be either to succumb to further Soviet pressure or to run the risk of nuclear war. This dilemma of the Western powers has been matched by a similar one facing the Soviets, namely, that of either backing down before what they apparently regard as a dangerous threat, or else risking the destruction of their own homeland. Such a set of opposing dilemmas, both stemming from the same political and military situation, would seemingly suggest a common interest on the part of both sides in relaxing the stringency of the alternatives. Thus far, it would seem that not only is this not the case, but in fact the exact opposite situation prevails. Instead of either side acting to lessen the tensions flowing from the confrontation in Germany, each has tended towards increasing the threatening nature of its posture vis-a-vis the opposing side, and thus towards increasing the likelihood of general war in the event of armed conflict. The reason for this ostensible anomaly would appear to lie largely in the nature of the "German problem," and in both sides' attitude toward its relation to the status quo.

94. As has been suggested earlier, the crux of the explosive "German problem" is not the continued presence of U.S. forces, per se, in West Germany, or even the presence of Western forces in Berlin. It is the growing military power of West Germany (whose development these forces are making possible), and the potential implications of German military power for the unsettled situation in Eastern Europe. This is the issue on which U.S. and Soviet political objectives, and the military strategies supporting them, reach the point where they may "go critical." For the U.S. the

growing West German power represents the achievement of a decade of successful political and military policy. For the Soviets the same fact constitutes the culmination of a decade of major political reversals<sup>1/</sup> and of deepening concern over the stability of its position in Eastern Europe.<sup>2/</sup> As long as the German Federal Republic continues to proclaim that Berlin is the future capital of Germany, and tries to add substance to these claims by such devices as holding formal Bundestag meetings in West Berlin and maintaining there a permanent home for the president of the Federal Republic, the specter of the historic German capacity for international trouble-making--a renewed Drang nach Osten--must haunt Eastern Europe. If the West German claim to Berlin could be settled, there would probably be settled with it, from the Soviet viewpoint, most of the problems of eventual German reunification and of the Polish-German frontiers. On the other hand, if these problems cannot be settled soon, the Soviets may well feel that a showdown had better be had now rather than several years from now when West Germany may be stronger, under different and more ambitious leadership, and possibly the possessor of a nuclear weapons capability.<sup>3/</sup>

1/ The success of the Marshall Plan in the face of all-out Communist sabotage; the East German riots in 1953; the revolts in Hungary and Poland in 1956; the defection of Yugoslavia; the apparently widening split with Albania; the continued strength of NATO; the weakened position of the Communist Parties in Western Europe in spite of the fact that approximately one-fourth of the voters in France and Italy have consistently voted Communist; and the growing economic and political unity of Western Europe.

2/ The scientific infallibility of the dialectic as a means of predicting the future apparently leaves something to be desired. As late as 1948 the Soviets could have had a demilitarized Western Germany (they already had it) and a large say in the affairs of all Berlin (which again they already had). But with the Berlin Blockade, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and then the attack on South Korea they brought into being a military situation of great danger to themselves. After the death of Stalin major efforts were made to reverse the trend toward German rearmament; the Austrian Peace Treaty in 1955 and the "spirit of Geneva" gambit in the same year were dramatic evidences of this attempt. But the trend was too strong to reverse.

3/ Walter Lippmann, in a television interview on 15 June, stated that Khrushchev had given the following answer to a question on why he was in such a hurry for an immediate settlement of the German problem: "I have to be in a hurry. I must have the German frontiers fixed before Hitler's generals get nuclear weapons."

95. If the Soviet objective regarding Berlin and the German 1  
frontiers is as stated above, then it would seem apparent that 2  
a "free city" status for Berlin would largely accomplish this 3  
objective for them, even if the entire city were included in 4  
the arrangement and both sectors were placed under U.N. super- 5  
vision. In such an event, Khrushchev then could afford to 6  
wait. He would no longer have to be in a hurry because time 7  
would be on his side instead of against him. Each year that 8  
passed would then constitute a prescriptive ratification of 9  
the fact that Berlin was not the capital of Germany, that its 10  
inhabitants were no longer politically or legally connected 11  
with West Germany, and that the eastern frontiers of Germany 12  
(the Oder-Neisse Line) were settled de facto, if not de jure. 13  
As Khrushchev has hinted, if he could secure a peace treaty 14  
granting Free City status to West Berlin, token forces of the 15  
NATO powers could remain in West Berlin for a possibly indef- 16  
inite period. For the significance of the NATO forces as a 17  
symbol of Berlin's link to West Germany would have been 18  
changed to that of U.N. forces symbolizing Berlin's separation 19  
from West Germany. 20

96. It does not, of course, follow automatically that 21  
because Khrushchev wants this development, the U.S. and the 22  
Western European powers should not want it. But it is im- 23  
portant that the implications of the Soviet demands be quite 24  
clear. With their customary deftness in presenting ambiguous 25  
challenges, the Soviets are not asking that West Berlin 26  
should be turned over to the Communists. They are simply 27  
asking that West Berlin, which NATO for more than a decade 28  
has firmly insisted belonged to the West, should now be de- 29  
clared to belong to nobody. The difference in the two posi- 30  
tions is fundamental. The first effect of agreeing to the 31

Soviet demands would be a public and undeniable reversal  
of a major NATO commitment--however the shift were acclaimed  
as a victory for both sides.

97. The West Germans, we may certainly assume, would see  
any kind of "free city" status which divorced Berlin from the  
Federal Republic as a major political, economic and cultural  
loss for their nation.<sup>1/</sup> The British and the French, on the  
other hand, might possibly be prepared to settle for some  
kind of "accommodation" on this aspect of the problem, par-  
ticularly if it reduced the threat of nuclear war. If the  
earlier reasoning of this study is correct, however, it is  
West Germany and not Britain or France which constitutes the  
key country in U.S. strategic objectives for the defense of  
Western Europe. If a reneging by the West on the guarantee  
to West Berlin should bring about (1) a substantial dis-  
illusionment in West Germany with the value of NATO, (2)  
a weakening of West German confidence in, and identity with,  
the West, or (3) a conviction that the pressure of the  
power relationships in Europe once again required an accom-  
modation with the Russians, as at Tauroggen and Rapallo,<sup>2/</sup>

1/ NIE 23-60, The Outlook in West Germany (SECRET) states:  
"West German leaders, regardless of party, are convinced  
that Allied rights in Berlin and Berlin's economic and po-  
litical ties with the Federal Republic cannot be reduced  
or changed in any essential particular without serious  
damage to West German interests. They are particularly  
insistent that nothing be done to prejudice the Allied  
position that the Western presence in Berlin is based  
on the right of conquest. Any serious impairment of  
Western rights in Berlin would be regarded by many  
West Germans as the beginning of a series of events  
leading toward the eventual loss of the city to the  
GDR and as making even more remote the possibility of  
reunification on terms acceptable to West Germany."  
Page 8. (Emphasis added.)

2/ These two treaties have become famous as evidences of  
the historic tendency of the Germans, and especially  
of the German Army, to pursue foreign policy objectives  
determined almost wholly by their own view of the German  
national interest, and sometimes in contravention of  
existing political agreements presumably binding upon  
Germany. The German Army has injected a peculiar note  
(Continued on following page)

the price for the U.S. would almost certainly be too high. 1

98. The hard fact cannot be ignored that a solution of 2  
the Berlin problem, like the creation of the problem in the 3  
first place, lies readily within the choice of the Soviet 4  
Union. By the same token, German reunification is also a 5  
concession which the Soviet Union has in its power to grant 6  
at any time, if it should be willing to pay the price of 7  
giving up its East German satellite. The U.S. has no such 8  
ability to offer reunification to the Germans--whatever the 9  
price--because it could not deliver the West Germans to the 10  
Soviets. The U.S. must, therefore, depend upon different 11  
appeals in any contest for the loyalty of the West Germans. 12  
While there is certainly no requirement to cater to every 13  
whim of West Germany, a U.S. abandonment of the Federal 14  
Republic on any important aspect of the Berlin issue would 15  
undoubtedly cause the latter to entertain serious questions 16  
regarding the worth of the NATO guarantee. Also, in dis- 17  
sociating itself from West Germany, the U.S. would for the 18  
first time in a decade have abandoned the strategic principle 19  
upon which it has placed its primary reliance for containment 20  
of Soviet power in Europe, namely, the principle that West 21  
Germany represents the keystone of NATO's European defense 22  
structure. 23

Footnote 2/ continued from preceding page...

2/ into this problem by sometimes entering into foreign agreements whose nature was unknown even to its own government. At the Convention of Tauroggen in 1813, the Prussian Army initiated an alliance with Russia against Napoleon, unknown to the Prussian King Frederick William III, and in violation of prior agreements to aid France against England and restrict their own military development. In the Rapallo Treaty in 1922, Russia and Germany, which were both outcast nations, entered into an agreement of cooperation with each other; the German Army later, during its "secret" period of redevelopment, was aided by a very intimate association with Russia, unknown to a great part of the government of the Weimar Republic.

99. Similarly, if the U.S. attempted to negotiate a settlement which, say, offered to exchange a future West German nuclear capability for a renewal of Western occupation rights in Berlin, it would be admitting the ability of the USSR to determine the basis upon which the West would be suffered to remain. In effect, additional concessions would be offered for something which NATO has firmly insisted is already a Western possession--the right, based on conquest, to be in Berlin, subject to no one's approval. Moreover, the implication in such an arrangement that the West Germans might become a sort of second-class, conventionally armed, "cannon fodder" ally, to take the initial shock of a future war, might well have serious consequences for the West German attitude toward the NATO Alliance.<sup>1/</sup>

100. All this is not to imply that the U.S. must either "stand firm" in Berlin at the risk of general war, or else see its strategic objectives in Western Europe go down the drain. The worldwide pressures for arms control, when considered along with the political difficulties and strategic objectives of the Soviet Union, suggest that a Berlin settlement may be possible which contains "something for everybody," and yet which may at the same time not require the U.S. to

<sup>1/</sup> Defense Minister Strauss, for example, has been outspoken on this point. A Special Article in the Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, 6 July 1961 (SECRET), pp. 5-6, includes the following statements: "As defense minister, Strauss has consistently aimed at the creation of effective German military forces with the best possible equipment. He has taken it for granted that Bonn must have a nuclear weapons capability, and has attacked any 'discrimination' against the German forces. Shortly after becoming defense minister, he criticized what he called the 'two categories of NATO members, first class and tenth class.' In one of the impetuous statements he often finds it necessary to deny having made, he reportedly remarked that the German and other European armies would be equipped with atomic weapons, 'whether the Americans like it or not,' and that he had no intention of providing German 'foot-sloggers for the American atomic cavalry.'"

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deployments in NATO, and the military deployments of the  
other NATO countries, would then face a threat which could  
probably be more accurately gauged, because it would be  
farther away both in time and in distance.<sup>1/</sup> The possibility  
would, of course, have to be considered that reduction of  
the immediate Soviet threat might also reduce NATO's sense of  
urgency and willingness to make sacrifices for its own defense.  
But for the most part the NATO powers have shown little sense  
of urgency over the past decade. The burden of immediate  
defense against a Soviet attack will, in any event, clearly  
fall most heavily upon the developing West German forces  
and the U.S. retaliatory capability, neither of which is  
likely to be seriously impaired in the foreseeable future  
by a relaxation of tensions in Europe.

130. In sum, a political and military settlement along the  
lines of that suggested above should both reduce the divisive  
influences upon NATO and increase the capability and influ-  
ence of the NATO powers in assuming the initiative in the  
larger world struggle. A resolution of the German problem,  
however, in a way which preserves the unity and strength of  
Western Europe, is an indispensable precondition to such a  
development.

<sup>1/</sup> The Soviet capability for a surprise missile attack would  
not be affected, of course, but his Soviet option could be  
exercised at any time today.

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compromise its fundamental strategic objectives in Europe. 1  
The U.S. approach to this problem, however, must include the 2  
realization that the Soviet Union is almost certainly not 3  
going to agree to a settlement which requires it to abandon 4  
any of its fundamental objectives either. 5

101. Examination of the opposing objectives of the NATO and 6  
Soviet blocs, in the context of the existing situation, does 7  
not show that all of the objectives for each side are of 8  
equal significance as potential causes of war. In fact, much 9  
of the conflict between the opposing objectives would appear, 10  
from the preceding analysis, to be a matter of attitude to- 11  
ward the status quo--a status quo which each side finds 12  
unpleasant, and even threatening, but at least temporarily 13  
bearable in most respects. The areas where these opposing 14  
political objectives clearly intersect and contradict each 15  
other, to the extent that each side may be prepared to go to 16  
war in defense of its position, seem rather strictly circum- 17  
scribed. In other words, while both sides have definite 18  
ideas regarding the kind of settlement they would like to 19  
see in Europe, it is becoming fairly clear that there exist 20  
relatively few of these ideas which they are willing to im- 21  
plement at the risk of war. For example, the Soviet Union 22  
would obviously like to see U.S. forces leave Europe, West 23  
Germany completely neutralized and disarmed, and Yugoslavia 24  
returned to the Communist fold. But they have thus far not 25  
considered it prudent to go to war in order to attain these 26  
objectives. The U.S. would like to see the Soviets with- 27  
draw completely from the satellites, relax their military 28  
and political pressures on the neutral and pro-Western 29  
European nations, and dismantle the structure and activities 30  
of the Communist Party in non-Communist nations. But it has 31  
not been prepared to use military force to secure these 32  
objectives. 33

102. If there is to be meaningful arms control in Europe, 1  
with any expectation of reducing the likelihood of a devastat- 2  
ing war, it appears evident that those issues over which both 3  
sides do seem prepared to fight must be either resolved or at 4  
least reduced in potency. For the Soviets, such a reason for 5  
war would probably be any effort to change by force their 6  
present de facto sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and 7  
possibly any attempt by the West to maintain by force the link 8  
between Berlin and West Germany. For the West, such a cause 9  
for war would probably be a move by the Soviet Union to expand 10  
by force its present sphere of influence, and any attempt by 11  
the Soviets to disrupt by force the link between Berlin and 12  
the West. 13

103. Each side is using its military capabilities both to 14  
make clear its intentions and to emphasize its political ob- 15  
jectives. Thus the political issues for which each side will 16  
fight and the military deployments supporting these intentions 17  
are not only directly related to each other, but also tend to 18  
aggravate each other. Paradoxical as it may seem in the face 19  
of the rising armaments, a promising arms control settlement 20  
might be possible if the military deployments related to the 21  
critical political issues could be made the subject of negoti- 22  
ation at the same time that the political issues which were 23  
the cause of the armaments were considered for possible 24  
resolution. 25

104. It is not intended by this suggestion to enlarge the 26  
term "arms control" to include the settlement of political 27  
issues. But it is intended to suggest that the possibilities 28  
for settlement of either political or arms control problems 29  
might well be enhanced by enlarging the area of discussion of 30  
either one of these types of problems to include the other. 31

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In fact, the proposition may even be suggested that fruitful negotiations in either of these areas are of doubtful value if there are relevant issues in the other area which are not considered at the same time. Moreover, for the West to negotiate only on its present position in West Berlin would undoubtedly represent a major psychological and diplomatic defeat.

105. The overriding political issue for the U.S., and for the entire NATO Alliance (subject to special qualifications for the various members), is maintenance of the strength, unity and integrity of NATO. From the viewpoint of U.S. political strategy, the key European element of the NATO structure is West Germany. For the West Germans, and thus to a large extent for the U.S., the primary immediate test of the value of NATO is its ability to maintain the symbolic link between Berlin and West Germany.

106. For the Soviet Union, the key political issue appears to be the stabilization of its position in Eastern Europe. The chief destabilizing factor in this regard, from the Soviet standpoint, is the lack of a German peace treaty which ratifies what they regard as the political results of World War II. Until such a political settlement is achieved, several problems remain open: the German claim to the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse Line, the West German (and NATO) refusal to accept East Germany as an independent state, U.S., British and French insistence upon the indefinite extension of their occupation rights in Berlin, the West German claim that Berlin is the future capital of a reunited Germany, and the whole question of the legitimacy of the Soviet

1/ Any question of German reunification, of course, raises the question of the boundaries of the territory to be reunited.

occupation of the Eastern European satellites. The immediate  
device which the Soviets have fastened on in their efforts to  
effect a solution of these problems is the militarily awkward  
and precarious position of the Western allies in Berlin.

107. The primary arms control issue for both sides is the  
reduction of the likelihood of nuclear war. For the Soviets  
this issue has a special facet, namely, the prospect that  
West Germany may attain a more or less autonomous nuclear capa-  
bility within the next several years. For the U.S. and its  
NATO allies the key aspect of this issue is the threat posed  
by powerful Soviet ground forces in Central and Eastern Europe  
and particularly in East Germany--the threat against which  
the U.S. nuclear retaliatory threat is primarily raised.

108. If a political settlement could be devised which on  
the one hand tended to stabilize the Soviet position in  
Eastern Europe, and which on the other maintained the unity  
and integrity of NATO, both sides would attain some of their  
major political objectives--political objectives, it may be  
added, which both sides already appear willing to accept on  
a de facto basis. From the Western standpoint, an indispens-  
able requirement would be that West Germany's confidence in,  
and loyalty to, NATO not be compromised by the settlement.  
For the Soviets an indispensable requirement would be some  
formal acceptance by the West, and especially by West Germany,  
of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. Such a possible  
political settlement (conceivably even a peace treaty) might  
take something of the following form, as a package proposal  
by the West:

a. The Soviets to accept, formally, Berlin as the  
future capital of a reunited Germany--with complete

reunification to be delayed until such time as the international situation makes it possible.

b. All of Berlin to be internationalized under U.N. auspices, with current occupying powers appointed as trustees for their present sectors, and the West Germans authorized to act as agents to maintain the economic life of the western portion of the city.

c. Access to Berlin through East Germany to be guaranteed to the Western Powers (including West Germany) by the Soviet Union and by East Germany.

d. The West Germans to accept, de facto, the present boundaries between East and West Germany, and also the Oder-Neisse Line,<sup>1/</sup> by a statement to the effect that no attempt would be made to change present German frontiers by force.

e. The West Germans to accept East Germany as autonomous, on a confederal basis, "until such time as international conditions allow the unification of Germany."

109. An arms control settlement which might be negotiated along with a political settlement of the above nature would concentrate upon reducing the offensive elements of the military forces of the two power blocs in East and West Germany, and possibly in the entire Rapacki Plan area.<sup>2/</sup> For the Soviets this would constitute primarily the Soviet forces in the satellites, with possibly some of the satellite forces themselves being included at a later date. For

<sup>1/</sup> Adenauer could not, of course, formally agree to giving up the "lost territories." But much of the status quo might be accepted by the West Germans if they did not have to admit publicly that they were accepting it. Moreover, the present German population beyond the Oder-Neisse Line is reduced to an infinitesimal fraction of what it formerly was.

<sup>2/</sup> The Rapacki Plan usually is held to include East and West Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

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the U.S. and the NATO powers, such a settlement would concentrate on the nuclear elements. For a sufficient Soviet military concession, the U.S. might be willing not only to alter the arrangements by which it makes nuclear weapons in West Germany available to its allies (especially the West Germans), but also to reduce its own tactical nuclear forces there.

110. A settlement along the above lines would recognize that the problem of arms control, the Berlin problem, and the entire "German problem" are all indissolubly related, and that there is little likelihood of an effective solution in one of these areas if the other two are not included. Such a settlement, which would leave a rearmed West Germany as the main increment of NATO, would protect the primary U.S. strategic objective in Western Europe; a settlement which gave the Soviet Union a de facto acceptance of its dominance of Eastern Europe, including the East German frontiers, would protect a primary Soviet objective in Europe. A settlement in Berlin which recognized Berlin as the eventual capital of a confederated Germany (on the pattern of a Zollverein),<sup>1/</sup> in which East Germany would operate, in effect, as an independent state,<sup>2/</sup> might give both East and West Germans a basis for living together, if not in peace, at least without war. In

<sup>1/</sup> The German Zollverein (customs union) was created by Prussia in 1819 and was aimed at the multiple tariff systems criss-crossing Germany. By the middle of the 19th century the Zollverein had become a major factor in the gradual isolation of Austria and in the growing unification of Germany under the dominance of Prussia.

<sup>2/</sup> Such a settlement, which accords special status to individual states, is not unknown in modern German history. Bavaria, for example, had its own army, postal system, etc., even after Germany was unified in 1870, and today has its own political party in the Bundestag, allied to the CDU. Wurttemberg also enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy for many years after German unification. Prussia's former peculiar position in the German Reich is, of course, well known.

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the kind of confederated Germany discussed here, the East  
 Germans would not have to recognize the president of the  
 West German Federal Republic as Head of State,<sup>1/</sup> they need  
 not be represented in the Bundestag or Bundesrat, and the  
 Federal Republic need not have any authority over East  
 Germany, nor the right to put armed forces in East Germany.  
 The Federal Republic would, however, be granted the right of  
 access to Berlin, by treaty, in order to carry out its  
 economic responsibilities. The East Germans, on the other  
 hand, would keep their own armed forces, just as they do  
 today, their "socialist" political and economic system,<sup>2/</sup>  
 and their ties to the Communist bloc.

111. There are undoubtedly risks for the West in a proposal  
 of the type suggested above. Perhaps the most obvious criti-  
 cism is that such a settlement would not foreclose the Com-  
 munist's ability to harass the West's position in Berlin at  
 any time they chose.<sup>3/</sup> In fact, the point has sometimes  
 been made that, in the absence of control by the U.S. and  
 its Allies of access to West Berlin from West Germany, East  
 Germany can absorb West Berlin whenever it chooses to do so.  
 Once again, the U.S. would be confronted with the choice of  
 using force or permitting the absorption, but with the added  
 handicap of a weakened military and political posture.

- 1/ Such an arrangement, again, is not unique. India and Pakistan, for example, are members of the (British) Commonwealth, but do not recognize the Queen of England as Head of State.
- 2/ The socialist orientation of much of this area predates by several decades the Soviet occupation.
- 3/ Henry A. Kissinger, for example, has warned against attempts to solve the Berlin problem by diplomatic tinkering: "The issue in Berlin is not primarily one of finding negotiating expedients. The West will have to face the much more difficult problem of defining at what point Communist harassment becomes an intolerable threat to the freedom of Berlin. The attempt to avoid this problem has brought on the dangers which it sought to avoid. It has encouraged the Communists step by step to increase their pressure and to stake their prestige in a manner that makes any settlement safeguarding the freedom of Berlin extremely difficult." The Necessity for Choice, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), page 146.

112. But it would seem that the difficulties cited are 1  
inherent, not in new negotiating expedients, but in the 2  
nature of the Western position in the city. In the first 3  
place, the Western military traffic along the Autobahn, rail- 4  
road and canal from Helmstedt, and along the three twenty- 5  
mile wide air corridors from Hamburg, Hannover, and 6  
Frankfurt-am-Main, is only one part of the problem of main- 7  
taining access to Berlin. Over two million civilians in 8  
West Berlin depend upon civil traffic along these and other 9  
routes. Since 1955 the East Germans have been exercising 10  
control over civil traffic between West Berlin and West 11  
Germany with the tacit approval and cooperation of the 12  
Federal Republic. Possibilities for Communist harassment 13  
of this traffic--harassment which might affect the freedom 14  
of West Berlin as effectively as interference with military 15  
traffic--will remain, as before, whether military traffic 16  
goes unimpeded or not. If the Communists exploit these 17  
possibilities in an effort to absorb West Berlin, the West 18  
cannot avoid being faced with the choice of using force or 19  
permitting the absorption. 20

113. Moreover, even the unlikely prospect of control by 21  
the United States and its Allies of access to West Berlin 22  
from West Germany will not resolve this problem -- if the 23  
Communists choose to apply pressure. For, as pointed out 24  
above, opportunities for such Communist pressure are 25  
endemic in West Berlin's situation as a foreign body in 26  
a hostile environment, whether or not arteries are kept 27  
open from the West to the isolated entity. Just as 28  
municipal jurisdictions in the U.S. cannot keep their local 29  
affairs from becoming involved in regional problems, so 30  
are there numerous areas where the East Germans either have 31



or can claim to have joint concerns with West Berlin-- 1  
flight safety regulations, communicable diseases, law 2  
enforcement, mail, telephone, telegraph, personal movements, 3  
work permits, "subversive activities," etc. Opportunities 4  
for harassment by the Communists will be limited only by 5  
lack of imagination. While most of these opportunities 6  
cannot be exploited as easily as transport and supply, de- 7  
termined Communist action could probably still face the 8  
West with the problem of deciding when the threat to the 9  
freedom of Berlin had become intolerable. 10

114. However, if the Communists actually began serious 11  
harassment of West Berlin after accepting the settlement 12  
proposed herein, it would still seem to be true that the 13  
immediate military position of the West in Central Europe 14  
would be stronger than it is at present. A substantial 15  
reduction of Soviet forces in East Germany would almost 16  
certainly present to the West a more manageable military 17  
problem on the central front than it currently faces. 18  
The Soviets could, of course, reinforce their East German 19  
garrison by almost any number of divisions, presumably up 20  
to 50 or more, from the Soviet Union. Such a Soviet move 21  
is, however, always possible even at present--and would 22  
still be possible even if NATO had already achieved its 23  
goal of 30 divisions. If both sides had put into effect 24  
an agreement of the sort proposed here, then any major 25  
strengthening of the forces of either side would probably 26  
raise again the prospect of general war--an eventuality 27  
which it is certain that neither side desires. 28

115. Perhaps the most important consideration in favor 29  
of a settlement such as that proposed here is that the 30  
incentive for Communist harassment would probably be lower 31

than it is at present. If Berlin is important to the Soviets 1  
primarily as a symbol of other unresolved problems, then the 2  
alleviation of some of these problems should cause a reduction 3  
in Soviet pressures on West Berlin. But if the Soviets have 4  
no real interest in settling the German problem, and are 5  
merely using the West Berlin issue as a device to divide and 6  
weaken the Western Alliance, then they probably would not 7  
agree anyway to a settlement which would have the effect of 8  
reducing the virulence of the political issues and decreasing 9  
the risks in the NATO-Soviet confrontation. Again, if they 10  
have no interest in settling the German problem, and still 11  
agree to such a settlement, then their capability for harrying 12  
NATO over the issue of West Berlin would seem to be consider- 13  
ably lessened. 14

116. The point is sometimes made that any Western recogni- 15  
tion, however implicit, of the status quo in the satellites, 16  
and especially in East Germany, would constitute a defeat 17  
for the West and a prelude to further Communist aggrandize- 18  
ment.<sup>1/</sup> Pushed far enough, of course, this point becomes 19  
nonsensical, since the U.S. is already implicitly recognizing 20  
the status quo in the satellites simply by taking no effec- 21  
tive action to change the situation. Short, therefore, of a 22  
formal "quitclaim" deed for the satellites, issued by the 23  
West to the Soviets, there need be no Western feeling of 24  
additional defeat resulting from a failure to challenge the 25  
status quo publicly. 26

<sup>1/</sup> See, for example, Kissinger, *op. cit.*, especially pages 130-132, regarding East Germany: "The Soviet leaders are demanding recognition of their East German satellite so insistently because they know very well that acceptance by the West of the status quo is the best means for undermining the status quo." Page 132.

117. There can be no question that the Soviets would regard 1  
any Western acceptance of the status quo as a preliminary to 2  
a change in it in favor of the Communists. But this point is 3  
obvious from Communist doctrine. The problem, therefore, is 4  
not one of getting the Communists to renounce their designs 5  
on the status quo--a proposition which would require their 6  
apostasy as Communists--but it is one of bringing about con- 7  
ditions which will further U.S. political and military objec- 8  
tives in Europe. For the reasons suggested above, a political 9  
and arms control settlement of the sort proposed here might 10  
well be an important step in the right direction. 11

118. The crucial consideration in evaluating the effect of 12  
the proposed settlement upon U.S. strategic objectives is 13  
undoubtedly the attitude of the West Germans. U.S. policy 14  
in this respect is pursuing a fine line between wholehearted 15  
cooperation with the Federal Republic and cautious restraint 16  
upon German potentialities for military and political 17  
adventuring. If, as Kissinger and others have suggested, 18  
the U.S. should emerge from negotiations over Berlin in the 19  
role of a plausible villain who was preventing the reunifica- 20  
tion of Germany, then U.S. political objectives in West 21  
Germany might well be in danger. The net effect of the 22  
terms of the proposed settlement, however, would not seem 23  
to lend themselves to such an interpretation. If the agree- 24  
ment should constitute the first tangible step towards German 25  
reunification; if it contained an explicit recognition by 26  
the Communists of Berlin as the future capital of all Germany; 27  
if the West Germans continued to develop their military 28  
strength; and if there were a substantial reduction of the 29  
Soviet military pressure in East Germany--the position of 30  
the U.S. as a valued ally would seem to be stronger rather 31  
than weaker. 32

119. Although political leaders of West Germany would prob- 1  
ably balk at any suggestion that they would not receive nuclear 2  
weapons, there are many indications that the majority of the 3  
German people might willingly give up the idea if their fears 4  
of Soviet attack could similarly be reduced.<sup>1/</sup> While there is 5  
no question that the U.S. must deal with West Germany today 6  
as a sovereign nation, and that the West Germans' national 7  
decisions can no longer be made for them by the former oc- 8  
cupying authorities as in 1950, the U.S. commitment to train 9  
and equip West German forces for a wartime nuclear capability 10  
is by no means irrevocable, now would a failure to proceed 11  
with it be a transgression of West German sovereignty. It 12  
may be assumed that the primary hopes of the German people 13  
are for peace and security, not for military power. If the 14  
chances for the former appeared to be improved, with no 15  
diminution of the present status of the latter, there would 16  
almost certainly be no mass protest by the West German people. 17  
Moreover, a decision not to equip the West Germans with 18

<sup>1/</sup> The chapter by Gordon Craig, "Germany and NATO," in Klaus Knorr (Ed), NATO and American Security, is particularly informative. Regarding the Rapacki Plan, for example, he remarks: "Konrad Adenauer's first response to this proposal was given at the NATO Council meeting in December 1957 and was surprisingly cordial. The Chancellor stated that he had read the letter from Bulganin 'with great attention' and 'would see no objection to attempting to inquire through diplomatic channels from the Soviet Government what precise conceptions form the bases of these proposals.' This statement was greeted with something akin to enthusiasm in Western Germany, and Adenauer was credited with transforming NATO policy and laying the basis for fruitful negotiations with the Soviets. It came, therefore, as a shock to many when, in a radio address on January 15, Adenauer attacked the proposals for an atom-free zone as a Soviet maneuver to destroy NATO and prepare the way for the Communist domination of Europe, and when, a week later, he repeated this in an answer to Bulganin's letter of December 8. The cartoonist Flora must have summed up the feelings of many when he drew a picture captioned 'Der sehr gestrenge Herr Papa,' showing a stern-faced Adenauer dragging a small and wistful Michel away, while a balloon labeled 'Rapacki Plan' floated off into the air." Page 255.

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nuclear weapons would always be reversible (though with a 1  
certain time lag for training), depending upon the manner in 2  
which the Soviets observed the agreement. 3

120. The U.S. "sword and shield" military strategy would not 4  
be significantly affected by the suggested alterations in 5  
military deployments. All U.S. shield forces would remain 6  
in their current locations (with possibly some modification 7  
in Berlin), and would continue to act as a deterrent to 8  
aggression. In the event of an attack by the Soviets, U.S. 9  
forces would still be immediately involved. Also, the 10  
Soviets would still be required to mount a large-scale 11  
military action to overcome the defending force, and 12  
the sword could still retaliate from Britain, Spain, the 13  
U.S., or waters surrounding Europe, and from West Germany 14  
if nuclear forces were still deployed there. On the other 15  
hand, if the Soviets removed a large part of their forces 16  
from East Germany, their capability to mount a decisive 17  
surprise attack would be substantially reduced. Moreover, 18  
with the military power of West Germany continuing to grow, 19  
the capability of the Soviets to overwhelm NATO by a surprise 20  
attack should be gradually reduced--short, that is, of a mass 21  
mobilization of their forces. The latter situation is, 22  
however, little different from that prevailing at present. 23  
Thus, both for deterrence and for defense, the U.S. would 24  
not seem to be in a weaker position than today, while the 25  
risks of triggering a destructive war would appear to be 26  
lessened. 27

121. In sum, under the proposed alterations in NATO deploy- 28  
ment, U.S. political objectives in Europe would not seem to 29  
be compromised. U.S. shield forces would still remain as 30

an earnest of the U.S. guarantee to NATO, backed by the  
nuclear retaliatory forces. The restoration and integration  
of West Germany into a unified Western Europe--economically,  
politically, and militarily--could continue. The chances of  
containment of the Soviet Union would seem to be improved.  
Meanwhile, one of the gravest sources of dissension and  
unrest within the Western Alliance--the fear of nuclear  
war--would probably be reduced. For the Soviets, the fear  
of nuclear war would be reduced only if they refrained from  
aggression.

122. If such a political and military settlement in Europe  
could be achieved, the U.S. might be in a stronger position  
to devote its attention, energies, and resources to the  
larger world struggle--a struggle whose progress may well  
have in the future an impact upon U.S. security equal to  
that of the European confrontation. The Soviet Union  
would, of course, be similarly freed to increase its chal-  
lenge to the West elsewhere on the globe. The Western  
democratic system should, however, be judged to have at  
least an equal chance in the struggle for the confidence of  
the emerging nations.

#### IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO IN GENERAL

123. Should it be possible to achieve a political and mili-  
tary settlement in Germany along the lines adumbrated above,  
the effect upon NATO would almost certainly be a salutary  
one. Much of the present discontent with NATO strategy  
appears to stem from three principal sources: (1) the very  
nature of nuclear weapons, and their potential implications  
for the security of the peoples of Europe; (2) differences  
of opinion regarding the relationship of NATO to the indi-  
vidual national interests of NATO members elsewhere in the

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world; and (3) disagreements regarding the magnitude and nature of the Communist threat.

124. The first source of discontent--the almost inconceivably destructive nature of nuclear weapons--has spawned contradictory fears among the various NATO members. On the one hand, there is the fear that the U.S. might not defend Europe, under conditions of grave danger to its own national existence. And on the other hand, a fear exists that the U.S. might defend Europe, under conditions fraught with grave danger to the national existence of the countries being defended. Any settlement in Germany which tended to remove some of the grounds for either or both these fears, without at the same time weakening the European resistance to Communism, would tend to strengthen NATO.

125. It is also quite possible that if Western European fears of a nuclear war could be reduced, a healthier, more confident, and more positive European attitude might tend to prevail towards the world struggle with Communism, both inside and outside Europe. Within Europe, increased efforts might be expended upon the political and economic unification of a region which has a common cultural heritage and an immense combined potential, but which is still beset by the divisive influences of conflicting national interests. Pressures in individual countries to construct or control their own nuclear deterrents, or conversely, to remain apart from situations or actions which might involve them in nuclear war, all tend to increase the obstacles to mutual trust, cooperation and unity among the nations of Europe. Outside Europe, the position of the West in the struggle with Communism would be vastly improved if the European nations'

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sense of nuclear insecurity could be allayed. At present, 1  
European fears of being drawn into a nuclear war originating 2  
in other areas of the world such as Southeast Asia, and their 3  
feeling of relative impotence in any serious altercation 4  
between the two nuclear giants, tend to reduce, fractionize, 5  
or otherwise distort Europe's relations and reduce its in- 6  
fluence in the rest of the world. 7

126. These European attitudes resulting from the inter- 8  
national implications of nuclear weapons are closely related 9  
to the second factor which has tended to cause disunity in 10  
NATO, namely, differences of opinion regarding NATO's re- 11  
lationship to the individual national interests of NATO 12  
members throughout the world. Some of the European nations, 13  
for example, have insisted that NATO must underwrite their 14  
national policies in colonial and former colonial areas. 15  
At the same time they are apparently fearful of taking too 16  
firm a stand in opposition to Communist provocations in 17  
these regions. Unwilling to see their power positions 18  
deteriorate further, they seem increasingly attracted to a 19  
policy of sauve qui peut. The situation suggests the analogy 20  
of a cut-throat poker game, dominated by two big winners, 21  
with the losers playing their cards close to their chests, 22  
hedging their bets, staying out of the large pots, and 23  
watching for more or less surreptitious opportunities to 24  
recoup their losses at the expense of the less experienced 25  
players. <sup>1/</sup> 26

1/ Examples: The Belgian "withdrawal" from the Congo, under rather questionable circumstances; the Dutch insistence upon "self-determination" for the inhabitants of Western New Guinea, in an area where until the past few years there was almost no planning or concern for local participation in government; the desperate attempts of the French to retain influence in their former colonies by a combination of military force, political maneuvering and economic pressure; the masterful but losing British campaign to hold onto the remnants of their former position in the Middle East; the Spanish efforts to work both the Arab and colonialist sides of the street in their African holdings; the Portuguese frank use of their membership in NATO in attempts to garner support for their colonial policies.



127. Yet, from the standpoint of the total Western posture 1  
against Communism, the former colonial powers represent a 2  
major potential source of strength. It is, of course, true 3  
that the Europeans have often been the objects of xenophobic 4  
resentment, and that they are used as the symbol of all the 5  
ills besetting the underdeveloped nations. NATO as an 6  
organization has become tarred with the same brush. But it 7  
is also true that through Europe pass the closest economic 8  
and cultural ties between the colonial areas and the rest 9  
of the world. These ties could become a symbol of joint 10  
interest and mutual strength, instead of a residual symbol 11  
of colonial servitude, if (1) the Western nations increas- 12  
ingly aided the underdeveloped regions through the anonymous 13  
respectability of such multinational organizations as the 14  
OECD, instead of attempting to retain privileged national 15  
positions (and therefore exploitive ones--at least in local 16  
eyes); and (2) if the former colonial powers accepted the 17  
reality, as well as the forms, of genuine local autonomy-- 18  
a prospect which might also be furthered by continually 19  
greater subordination of individual nation's interests 20  
and prerogatives in favor of joint organizations such as 21  
the OECD. 22

128. There are effective precedents in the past for such a 23  
development. The OEEC and the Colombo Plan are two which 24  
come immediately to mind. The present attempts to associate 25  
the former Belgian, French and Italian colonies in Africa 26  
with the Common Market further suggest both the possibility 27  
and the nature of such a broad international political- 28  
economic grouping. A later association of Great Britain, 29  
and perhaps parts of the Commonwealth, with the same organ- 30  
ization, might hold out even further hope for political 31

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order and economic progress in regions which will almost 1  
certainly be woefully weak and isolated before the destructive 2  
pressures of international Communism. Such an absorption and 3  
blending of some of the international interests of NATO's 4  
individual members into a larger organizational whole might 5  
well, for the first time, allow the West to offer a sub- 6  
stantive and effective alternative to Communist pressures 7  
upon the underdeveloped nations. At the same time the present 8  
divisive effects of these individual national interests upon 9  
NATO might well be lessened, with a concurrent strengthening 10  
of NATO's unity of will and purpose. 11

129. As suggested above, the third cause of discontent with 12  
NATO's present strategy has been disagreement regarding the 13  
nature of the Communist threat. Generally, these disagree- 14  
ments have been concerned with (1) whether the Communist 15  
threat is primarily military or economic and social, and (2) 16  
whether its focus is primarily upon Europe or upon the under- 17  
developed areas of the world, and (3) whether the threat is 18  
primarily immediate or long-term. Because of these disagree- 19  
ments, the overall purposes, military plans and force re- 20  
quirements of NATO are in continual dispute. These dis- 21  
agreements are all exacerbated by the current confrontation 22  
in Germany. As long as the heavy concentration of Soviet 23  
forces deployed in East Germany poses a threat to Western 24  
Europe, NATO must remain prepared for either a surprise attack 25  
or for protracted suspense. If a German settlement could be 26  
arrived at which substantially reduced both the scope and the 27  
immediacy of the Soviet military threat in Europe, without 28  
compromising the Western ability to respond adequately to a 29  
Soviet betrayal of the settlement, the unity and clearness 30  
of purpose of NATO should be improved. The U.S. military 31

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